The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy by O\u27Sullivan, Julie R
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
1996 
The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy 
Julie R. O'Sullivan 
Georgetown University Law Center, osullij1@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1756 
 
33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 463 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Law and Politics Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons 
THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE: BAD LAW,
BAD POLICY
Julie O'Sullivan*
INTRODUCTION
The Watergate scandal-and the crisis in public confidence in government it
spawned-left us many legacies, one of which is the Independent Counsel ("IC")
statute.' Over twenty years after the fact, the "lessons" of the scandal itself
continue to be the dominant reference. It is time to evaluate the "lessons" of
Watergate's legacies and, in particular, the IC mechanism.
Watergate involved allegations not only of misconduct by officials at the highest
reaches of the Executive Branch, but also of the attempted perversion of the
criminal justice process. This attempt clearly was not successful, 2 but the threat
posed-highlighted in perhaps the most dramatic chapter in the Watergate saga,
the "Saturday Night Massacre"3 -was perceived as sufficiently serious to pro-
voke a crisis in public confidence in the impartial administration of criminal
justice. The IC statute was designed to reassure the public that persons of political
importance to the President will not receive more favored consideration in
criminal investigations and prosecutions than would the average citizen. To
promote the appearance and reality of evenhanded justice, it was felt that such
investigations and prosecutions must be removed from their traditional home in
the Department of Justice (the "DOJ") and entrusted to someone not chosen by, or
subject to the control of, the administration. The requisite independence is sought
to be achieved in the statute through the judicial appointment of an IC who may be
removed by the Attorney General only upon a showing, satisfactory to a reviewing
court, of good cause or disability.
This essay suggests that although the IC statute was intended to address a
perceived problem in the criminal process, it appears over time to have been
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; former Associate Counsel in the
Whitewater Investigation (Jan. 1994-Oct. 1994) under regulatory Independent Counsel Robert B. Fiske, Jr. and
statutory Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr; former Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of New York; former Associate, Davis Polk & Wardwell. The author would like to thank all
those who kindly undertook to read drafts of this essay and, in particular, Prof. Jerry Lynch, Prof. David
McCarthy, Gabrielle Wolohojian, and Dwight Bostwick for their generous contribution of ideas and comments.
1. The Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994). The statute was first
enacted as the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1867, and has been reenacted three
times. See Pub. L. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1982); Pub. L. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293 (1987); Pub. L. 103-270, 108
Stat. 732 (1994).
2. See infra notes 55, 161-64 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
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adopted as the mechanism by which any questions about the criminal or ethical
conduct of senior public officials can credibly be investigated and addressed. The
consequences are twofold. First, the IC mechanism is overused; it is invoked to
displace the DOJ in cases where the likelihood that political pressure will derail the
appearance or reality of prosecutorial fairness is low. Second, in cases where the
political stakes are high-where, for example, the allegations of misconduct
concern the President or Attorney General-the growth of the perceived function
and importance of the IC mechanism has heightened the political consequence of
IC investigations. Given the public and press attention devoted to such investiga-
tions, partisans cannot afford to let the IC process simply unfold and the political
chips fall where they may. Recent experience demonstrates that the favored means
by which to blunt the political damage posed by an IC investigation is to attack as
biased the IC, or the judges that appointed him. One of the "lessons" of the
operation of the IC statute, then, is that in cases of potentially great political import
it creates partisan incentives to generate the very "appearance" problems that the
statute sought to erase. As a consequence, although the IC mechanism in general
may enjoy public support, the political dynamics of the statute mean that in the
high-profile cases at the heart of the statute partisans will seek to destroy that
which the statute is designed to further: public confidence in the integrity of the
results of the independent investigation.
The IC mechanism, then, seems to guard against "appearance" problems in
lower profile cases where no such problems truly exist, for example in the
Theodore Olson and Timothy Kraft affairs, but does not, in today's political
climate, operate to guarantee the "appearance" of justice is the high-profile cases
where its intervention may be justified, such as in Iran-Contra and Whitewater.
Even if it does not operate to cure serious "appearance" problems, however, can
the IC mechanism be justified as necessary to the "reality" of the equitable
administration of the criminal laws? I would submit that the statute, and the
political dynamic the statute generates, encourage ICs to employ their vast,
unchecked powers to impose a harsher and potentially inferior brand of justice
upon those subject to IC investigation. On balance, it seems to me that the IC
statute is not worth its high cost in human, financial and systemic terms.
The power to enforce the laws applicable to all citizens should be returned to the
Executive Branch. Abandoning the IC mechanism may not only correct some of
the inequities and potential abuses in its operation, it will also reorient the relevant
inquiry. When allegations of wrongdoing by senior public officials arise, the
primary focus should not be whether those officials are subject to criminal penalty
but rather whether they are qualified to serve in high public office. Ensuring the
equitable imposition of criminal penalties, while a significant goal, is less impor-
tant than informing the public of the relevant facts, letting the political processes
work to address the problem and thus promoting public confidence that this
democracy functions as it should. The IC statute in effect says-contrary to the
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lessons of history-that these processes cannot work. Further, the statute entrusts
this function to the IC, who, as a criminal prosecutor, is qualified only to assure
fairness in the criminal process, not to explore public officials' fitness to serve the
public. He cannot, and given the traditions -and rules governing our criminal
process, in fairness should not be asked to perform this larger function. Ultimately,
it may be Congress or its delegees, not the IC, who should take the leading role in
identifying for the public what happened and what should be done to remedy the
problem, for now and in the future.
STATUTORY SUMMARY
The statute operates generally as follows. It sets forth a list of "covered
persons" as to whom, Congress has determined, the DOJ is conclusively deemed
to have a conflict of interest in criminal investigations because of the covered
persons' political power or importance to the success of an administration. These
"covered persons" include the President, the Vice President, cabinet level officials
(including the Attorney General), certain high-ranking officials in the Executive
Office of the President and the DOJ, the Director and Deputy Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service,
and certain officials involved in the President's national political campaign.4
When the Attorney General receives specific and credible5 information "suffi-
cient to constitute grounds to investigate",6 whether these covered persons may
have violated federal criminal law,7 she is required to commence a "preliminary
investigation." 8 After the Attorney General has completed the preliminary investi-
gation, or 90 days have elapsed,9 she must then report to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, Special Division for Appointing Independent
Counsels ("Special Division"), which was created "for the purpose of appointing
4. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (1994).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 591(d)(1)(A), (B).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a).
7. Id. (excepting from the violations covered by the Act those classified as Class B or C misdemeanors and
infractions). The triggering information may come from anyone, including Congress. The Act gives certain
committees and Members of Congress the power "to request in writing that the Attorney General apply for the
appointment of an independent counsel." § 592(g)(1). The Attorney General is required to respond to this request
within a specified time but is not required to accede to it. § 592(g)(2).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a). In certain circumstances, the Attorney General may, in her discretion, conduct
preliminary investigations and refer matters to the Special Division for appointment of an IC where persons not
expressly covered by the statute are implicated. Thus, when an Attorney General receives specific and credible
information sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate a person not covered by the Act and she determines that
an investigation or prosecution of the non-covered person by the DOJ may result in a "personal, financial or
political conflict of interest," the Attorney General may conduct a preliminary investigation. § 591(c)(1). Further,
when the Attorney General receives specific and credible information sufficient to constitute grounds to
investigate whether a Member of Congress violated any federal law and she determines that it would be "in the
public interest," she may conduct a preliminary investigation. § 591(c)(2).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(1), (c)(1)(B) (1994).
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independent counsels." 10
If the Attorney General determines at the conclusion of the preliminary
investigation that "there are no reasonable grounds to believe that further investi-
gation is warranted," she will notify the Special Division and that Court "shall
have no power to appoint an independent counsel with respect to the matters
involved." If, however, the preliminary investigation reveals that there are
"reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted," then she
"shall apply to the [Special Division] for the appointment of an independent
counsel." 1 2 Under the statute, the Attorney General's decision to apply to the
Special Division for the appointment of an IC is not reviewable "in any court";' 3
the Attorney General's refusal to refer a case to the Special Division is also
unreviewable 
1 4
The Special Division has the sole discretion to select the IC to be appointed, and
it is the court's responsibility to define that IC's prosecutorial jurisdiction.' 5 In
defining the IC's jurisdiction, the court is directed to "assure that the independent
counsel has adequate authority to fully investigate and prosecute the subject matter
with respect to which the Attorney General has requested the appointment of
independent counsel, and all matters related to that subject matter."' 16 This
jurisdiction must "also include the authority to investigate and prosecute Federal
crimes... that may arise out of the investigation or prosecut ion of the matter...
including perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation
of witnesses." 
1 7
10. 28 U.S.C. § 49 (1994); see also § 593(b)(1). The court consists of three circuit court judges or justices
appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988) ("under the Act the Special
Division has no power to appoint an independent counsel sua sponte; it may only do so upon the specific request
of the Attorney General").
12. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1) (1994).
13. 28U.S.C. § 592(f).
14. See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695 ("the courts are specifically prevented from reviewing the Attorney
General's decision not to seek appointment"); In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div. 1987)
(Attorney General's decision not to seek appointment of an IC under section 592(b) was final and Special Division
had no authority to override this determination through referral of a "related" matter under section 594(e)); H.R.
CoNF. REP. No. 452, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1987) ("The conferees agree that an Attorney General's
determinations under the independent counsel law are not subject to judicial review. This includes such
determinations as whether.., to request appointment of an independent counsel.... An exception is the Attorney
General's decision to remove an independent counsel from office."); United States v. Tucker, No. 95-3268, 1996
WL 112414, at *4 (8th Cir. March 15, 1996) (in holding that Attorney General referrals of matters to an IC under
section 594(e) are not subject to judicial review, noting congressional intent "that unreviewability of the Attorney
General's decisions is the rule when the independent counsel law does not expressly provide otherwise"); cf
Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 1986) (no judicial review is available of decisions by the Attorney
General not to conduct preliminary investigations); Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(per curiam) (same).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(1) (1994).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(3).
17. Id. Under section 593(c), the jurisdiction of an independent counsel may be expanded to include matters
unrelated to his original jurisdiction as defined by the Special Division. First, upon referral of a matter to the
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With respect to all matters within the IC's jurisdiction, the statute grants the IC
"full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecuto-
rial functions and powers of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and
any other officer or employee of the Department of Justice."' 8 These functions
include: conducting grand jury proceedings; engaging in civil and criminal
litigation, including court proceedings and appeals; making applications for
witness immunity, warrants, subpoenas or other orders; framing and signing
indictments; and initiating and conducting prosecutions.19
As to the means for carrying out an IC mandate, the IC has the power to
"appoint, fix the compensation, and assign the duties of such employees as such
independent counsel considers necessary (including investigators, attorneys and
part-time consultants). ' ' 20 He also has a virtually unlimited budget; the DOJ is
required to pay "all costs relating to the establishment and operation" of any IC
office. 2' Further, the statute imposes no limitation on the duration of an IC's
Special Division by the Attorney General, the Special Division may expand the prosecutorial jurisdiction of an
existing IC in lieu of the appointment of another IC. § 593(c)(1). Second, if an IC discovers possible criminal
violations that are not related to his jurisdictional mandate, he may submit the information to the Attorney
General. If, after conducting a preliminary investigation and giving "great weight to any recommendations of the
independent counsel," § 593(c)(2)(B), the Attorney General determines that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that further investigation is warranted, the Special Division "shall expand the jurisdiction of the
appropriate independent counsel to include the matters involved or shall appoint another independent counsel to
investigate such matters." § 593(c)(2)(C).
In section 594(e), the statute also includes a "procedure for an Independent Counsel to confirm whether his
jurisdiction, as conferred by the Special Division upon the Attorney General's application, extends to a particular
matter. If an Independent Counsel believes that a matter is related to (and therefore encompassed within) the
jurisdiction defined by the Special Division, he may request that the Attorney General or the Special Division
refer that matter to the Independent Counsel." Brief of Appellant at 21, United States v. Tucker, No. 95-3268,
1996 WL 112414 (8th Cir. March 15, 1996). If the Attorney General or the Special Division, as the case may be,
determines that the matter is "related," and as such that it falls within the Independent Counsel's existing
jurisdiction, she may formally refer investigation and prosecution of the matter to the Independent Counsel. 28
U.S.C. § 594(e) (1994). When the Special Division makes such a referral under section 594(e), it can reinterpret or
clarify the original grant of jurisdiction to the IC, but cannot expand that jurisdiction; expansion of jurisdiction to
include matters not related to the original matter referred may only be made by the Special Division, under section
593(c)(2), at the request of the Attorney General. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 680 n. 18, 685 n.22 (1988).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1994). The Attorney General, however, retains "direction or control as to those matters
that specifically require the Attorney General's personal action" under the wiretapping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2516
(1994). 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1994).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(l)-(10).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 594(c) (1994).
21. Id. § 594(d)(2) (1994); see also DAVID L. CLARKE, GAO FINANcLAL AuDrr-ExPENDrrURES BY SIx
INDEPENDENT COUNSELS FOR THE Six MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1995, GAO/AIMD-95-233 1 (September 29,
1995) ("In 1987, Public Law 100-202 established a permanent, indefinite appropriation within Justice to fund
expenditures by independent counsels."); S. REP. No. 101, 103d Cong., 1st Sess 27-29 (1994) (aim of the 1994
statutory cost "controls" amendment "is to codify the responsibility of independent counsels to spend federal
funds prudently and, as much as possible, in the same manner as other federal prosecutors" but those limits are not
enforceable against the IC by those under investigation, the DOJ, or the Administrative Office charged with
administering them; "[flinal decisionmaking authority on expenditures ... thus lies solely with independent
counsels who are accountable for them"); H.R. REP. No. 224, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1993) (additional views
of Rep. Fish) ("Despite the use of misleading subtitles like 'Added Cost Controls', [the 1994 Reauthorization
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investigation; the only temporal limitation is the statute of limitations generally
applicable to the alleged violation at issue.22
The IC "may be removed from office, other than by impeachment and
conviction, only by the personal action of the Attorney General and only for good
cause, physical or mental disability ... ,or any other condition that substantially
impairs the performance of such independent counsel's duties."' 23 In the event the
Attorney General removes an IC under this standard, she must file a report
justifying her action to the Special Division and Congress, 24 and the Attorney
General's action is subject to judicial review in federal court.25
The IC is required to cooperate with Congress in the exercise of its oversight
jurisdiction over the conduct of the IC investigation 26 and is subject to certain
reporting requirements.2 1 Most notably, when the IC believes that he has com-
pleted his task and is ready to terminate his office, he must file a final report with
the Special Division "setting forth fully and completely a description of the work
of the independent counsel, including the disposition of all cases brought.",28
Although the decision whether to release publicly the final report is up to the
Special Division,29 these reports have regularly been made public at the conclusion
of IC investigations.
THE APPEARANCE OF EQUAL JUSTICE
The primary political impetus behind the Independent Counsel legislation was
"public opinion polls and the elections of 1974 and 1976 [indicating] that some
action should be taken to help restore public confidence in government after
Watergate." 30 Bolstering public credibility in the entire government being beyond
Act] actually allows independent counsels to continue to enjoy virtually unlimited budgets. The expenses of all
independent counsel would remain under a permanent indefinite appropriation and, thus, totally outside the
scrutiny of the annual appropriations process.").
22. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 672 (1988) ("[tjhere is concededly no time limit on the
appointment of a particular counsel").
23. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (1994); see also § 596(b)(2) (1994) (the Special Division may terminate an
investigation only where the matters within the IC's jurisdiction are "completed or so substantially completed that
it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to complete such investigations and prosecutions").
24. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(2).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(3).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 595(a)(1) (1994).
27. An independent counsel must file an expenditure report with the Special Division every six months. 28
U.S.C. § 594(h)(l)(A) (1994); S. REP. No. 101, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1993). Further, an IC must submit
annual reports on his activities to Congress to justify his expenditures. 28 U.S.C. §§ 595(a)(2) (1994). He must
also advise the House of Representatives of any substantial, credible evidence that may constitute grounds for
impeachment. § 595(c) (1994).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(l)(B) (1994).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(2).
30. KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN AMERiCAN POLrTcs 72
(1992); see also id. at 44-45, 50-54 (discussing public opinion polls in the seventies indicating an increasing lack
of faith in the government and congressional reaction).
[Vol. 33:463
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the power of legislation, Congress addressed the particular problem Watergate
presented by drafting legislation whose "basic purpose ... is to promote public
confidence in the impartial [criminal] investigation of alleged wrongdoings by
government officials."'" The statutory mechanism does not necessarily reflect a
congressional judgment that DOJ attorneys are incapable of conducting a fair and
impartial criminal investigation of any matter involving any covered person.32
Rather, it reflects the view that "[t]he appearance of justice is just as important as
justice itself, in terms of maintaining public confidence in our judicial system." 33
It is important to understand as an initial matter what Congress' evolving notion
of the appearance of equal justice and of "independence" demands. In examining
the working of the statute over time, Congress became concerned that, in removing
the potential for favored treatment of administration officials, the IC statute
actually operated to subject public officials to a harsher, or at least different, brand
of justice than the average citizen.34 Congress has responded to this perceived
unequal treatment by amending the statute to encourage ICs to make their
investigations look as much like DOJ investigations as possible-absent, of
course, the oversight of the Attorney General. For example, the modem incarna-
tion of the statute encourages the IC to borrow his prosecutorial staff from the DOJ
because "Justice detailees provide a ready source of the cost-effective, up-to-date
and experienced personnel that independent counsels need for a quick and solid
performance." 35 The statute further directs the IC to adhere to the policies of the
31. S. REP. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982).
32. See, e.g., S. REP. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982) ("The intent of the special prosecutor provisions is not
to impugn the integrity of the Attorney General or the Department of Justice. Throughout our system of justice,
safeguards exist against actual or perceived conflicts of interest without reflecting adversely on the parties who are
subject to conflicts."); 139 CONG. REC. S15,846-48 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993) (remarks of Sen. Cohen)
(emphasizing "appearance issue"); 128 CONG. REc. S20,819 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Rudman)
("I must point out that the act is not intended to imply any mistrust or doubt in the veracity or impartiality of our
U.S. Attorney General. Indeed, I do not doubt that they would properly investigate allegations of malfeasance by
high ranking officials in the executive branch. Instead, the act is intended to prevent potential conflicts of interest
that would give rise to an appearance that the Attorney General would be incapable of impartially investigating
allegations. Essentially, it prevents a problem before it arises.").
33. 139 CONG. REc. S 15,847 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993) (remarks of Sen. Cohen).
34. See 128 CONG. REc. S 20,820 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Levin) ("[T]he special prosecutor
provisions must reflect our best effort to balance two competing interests: to insure that persons in high office are
prosecuted for their crimes without political favoritism, and to insure that these same persons are not unfairly
prosecuted solely because of their positions.... Our goal should be that high public officials be treated no better
and no worse than other citizens."); see also S. REP. No. 101, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 25-28, 31, 32 (1993)
(discussing need to avoid potential abuse by IC); H.R. REP. No. 224, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1993) (same); S.
REP. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 12, 16-17, 19, 22 (1982) (same).
35. S. REP. No. 101, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26 (1993) ("[An] amendment was adopted which would clarify
the ability of Justice Department employees to be detailed to an independent counsel's staff if requested by that
independent counsel. This provision was added, again, to ensure that independent counsel cases are handled as
much like other federal prosecutions as possible and to make it clear that independent counsels should avail
themselves of the legal, investigatory and administrative expertise at the Department."); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 594(d)(1) (1994) (authorizing IC to request assistance from DOJ).
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DOJ36 and counsels him to confer with the DMJ 37 and local United States
Attorneys38 for guidance as to the content of DOJ policies. Congress has also made
the judgment that "it is not only permissible under current law, but appropriate for
the Attorney General to include [the DOJ's views of the potential prosecutorial
merit of the referred case] in filing[s] requesting appointment of an independent
counsel, since they will assist independent counsel in complying with Justice
Department law enforcement policies and operating in a manner similar to other
federal prosecutions." 
39
This obviously reveals just how thin the "appearance" of independence from
the DOJ need be (as well as underscoring the apparent congressional belief that
DOJ investigations are problematic only in appearance, not in reality). Congress
would essentially like-but does not require-that IC investigations proceed as a
DOJ investigation, staffed by experienced and professional DOJ personnel, sup-
ported by DOJ resources, and run according to DOJ policies, except for the man or
woman at the top-who, for appearances sake, must be "independent." The
achievement of the purposes of the statute depends upon the public perception that
this one individual-the IC-is truly independent of political forces; only then will
the public accept as just the resolution of a politically charged case. Does the
statutory mechanism in fact ensure that the IC is viewed as independent? Perhaps
in theory but, I submit, not necessarily in practice in those cases at the heart of the
statute: the greater the political sensitivity of a case and thus the perceived political
importance of the results of the IC investigation, the greater are the incentives to
impugn the independence and ability of the IC.
Although the IC mechanism was born of and responsive to a perceived crisis of
confidence in the administration of criminal justice, its notoriety has purchased it a
broader function. The public perception seems to be that when an allegation of
wrongdoing of any kind is made against a high-ranking political figure and is
pressed by his or her political foes, someone impartial must sort it out. The view
appears to be-the Watergate Committee's success notwithstanding-that congres-
sional investigations are too political to be entirely trustworthy. Accordingly,
demands for an IC arise virtually whenever allegations of misconduct by senior
administration officials surface, whether those allegations concern conduct that is
simply ethically suspect or is potentially proscribed by criminal law. In short, the
IC mechanism appears to have been transformed from a means to ensure the
appearance of impartiality in criminal investigations to the means by which to
expose and root out wrongdoing by politically important officials.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f)(1) (1994).
37. Id.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(10) (1994); see also S. REP. 496,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17, 22 (1982) (amendment to
require compliance with DOJ policies and to authorize consultation with U.S. Attorney in order to ensure that
officials receive the same treatment as ordinary citizens).
39. S. REP. No. 101, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1993).
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The very importance of the IC statute itself ironically may prove the statute's
downfall. Quite simply, given the visibility of the statute, and press and public
interest in its workings, the political consequences of a referral and either an
indictment or a declination in a high-profile case are too serious for political actors
to leave the process unattended. Politics today demand that doubt be cast on the
independence, judgment or ability of an IC where the actions of that IC may
interfere with partisan interests. The object-and predictable consequence-is to
undermine what the statute seeks to promote: public confidence in the integrity of
the results of an IC's investigation in politically sensitive cases.
Take first the appointment process. The appointment of the IC by a panel of
unelected and politically unaccountable (and thus, presumably, apolitical) judges
is the primary means by which the statute seeks to remove any suggestion of
administration influence and to thus enhance public confidence in the results of
politically charged investigations. The apparent assumption-one that in other
contexts has increasingly come under public attack by influential persons such as
Senator Dole and New York Governor Pataki-is that federal judges, once their
political appointment and confirmation process is behind them, are purged of any
suspect political affiliation. I have no doubt that the three-judge panel responsible
for selecting ICs, the Special Division, does in fact exercise its prerogatives with
an impartial eye to obtaining a truly independent counsel. The central inquiry here,
however, is not about realities, it is about appearances. Recent events demonstrate
that, once a case has become heavily politicized, the judiciary will not be exempted
from charges of "appearance" problems.
In January 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno was faced with daily demands-
led by a chorus of Republicans-to appoint an IC to investigate Whitewater and
the Vincent Foster suicide. The IC statute had lapsed due to opposition by
Republican critics of Judge Lawrence Walsh's Iran-Contra investigation. Attorney
General Reno, who is a supporter of the IC statute and wanted to await its
reauthorization, finally acceded to Republican demands and appointed an IC
pursuant to DOJ regulations. 40 Attorney General Reno's choice, Robert B. Fiske,
Jr. was widely lauded-he had a record while serving as the U.S. Attorney in New
York as a "tough-minded but judicious prosecutor,' 41 and is an "establishment
lawyer with Republican credentials and a reputation for unimpeachable integ-
rity.' , 42 Those bipartisan accolades largely evaporated when Mr. Fiske issued a
40. 28 C.F.R. § 600.1 (1995) (regulatory authority for appointment of independent counsel); 28 C.FR. § 603.1
(1994) (Attorney General's definition of Mr. Fiske's authority by final rule).
41. Michael Isikoff, Whitewater Special Counsel Promises 'Thorough' Probe, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1994, at
Al (" 'If you were creating the ideal special counsel from a test tube, you would come up with somebody who
looked exactly like Bob Fiske in experience, reputation and abilities,' said Arthur Liman"; "Republican former
attorney general Dick Thornburgh called Fiske a 'first-rate lawyer' who was a 'solid performer' as a U.S.
Attorney.").
42. Gerard Lynch & Philip Howard, Special Prosecutors: What's the Point?, WASH. POST, May 28, 1995,
at C7.
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report concluding that Vincent Foster had committed suicide. Political opponents
of the administration immediately went on the attack.a3 Suddenly, the regulatory
counsel mechanism-which the Republicans had demanded be invoked-was
faulty; suddenly, Republican prosecutor Robert Fiske was suspect.
On June 30, 1994, the IC statute, which had by now, not surprisingly, gained
Republican converts, was reauthorized. Attorney General Reno referred the
Whitewater matter to the Special Division. The Special Division was faced with a
choice. Clearly, as even members of Congress had noted when passing the 1994 IC
statute, the most time- and cost-efficient choice would have been to reappoint Mr.
Fiske, who had been working full-time on the matter for months and who was well
along in his investigation." Precedent also supported the move; while the
constitutional challenge to the IC statute was pending before the courts, statutory
ICs in the Iran-Contra and Nofzinger matters accepted dual appointments by the
Attorney General as regulatory ICs. 4 5 Thus, one could certainly argue that by
reappointing Mr. Fiske and thus affixing its "independent" imprimatur on him, the
Special Division could have removed any "taint" caused by his initial appoint-
ment by the Attorney General. Instead, the Special Division concluded that the
appearance of impartiality demanded the appointment of a new counsel.46 It
selected as the statutory IC Kenneth Starr, who reportedly also had been on
Attorney General Reno's short list for the appointment of a regulatory Whitewater
IC.47 Judge Starr is a respected lawyer with a distinguished record whose strong
Republican credentials would presumably insulate the choice-and the ensuing
investigation-from any politically motivated attack. Did it?
Given the political dynamics involved, it could not and did not. "Democrats...
complained first about Mr. Starr's conservative Republican background, then
about his public opposition to President Clinton's claim of immunity in a sexual
harassment suit. ' ' 4 8 As the press reported, "[plast appointments of independent
counsels have sometimes caused grumbling but rarely has an appointment pro-
43. In July 1994, Senator Lauch Faircloth, "who was highly critical of Mr. Fiske's report on the initial phases
of his investigation, wrote to Ms. Reno, ... rais[ing] questions of possible conflict"; subsequently ten other
conservative Republican lawmakers wrote directly to the Special Division's head, Judge David B. Sentelle,
asking the panel to replace Mr. Fiske. David Johnston, Appointment in Whitewater Turns Into a Partisan Battle,
N.Y. TWES, Aug. 12, 1994, atAl
44. 140 CONG. REc. S6,376 (daily ed. May 25, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Levin).
45. See Brief on Behalf of Amicus Curiae United States at 2, 31, In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (Nos. 87-5261, 5264, 5265), rev'd, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
46. See In re: Madison Guaranty Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. 94-1, Order at 3 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div. Aug. 4,
1994) (The Court "has determined that [appointment of Mr. Fiske as IC] would not be consistent with the
purposes of the Act. This reflects no conclusion on the part of the Court that Fiske lacks either the actual
independence or any other attribute necessary to the conclusion of the investigation. Rather, the Court reaches this
conclusion because the Act contemplates an apparent as well as an actual independence on the part of the
Counsel.").
47. See Michael Isikoff, N.Y Lawyer Fiske Is In Line To Head Whitewater Inquiry, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1994,
at A3.
48. Johnston, supra note 43, at Al.
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duced so much protest about the partisan loyalties of the prosecutor. ' 49 The
politicization of the appointment process itself reached new heights, however,
when questions were raised about the very persons intended to guarantee the
independence and impartiality of IC choices: the Special Division judges.
The press broke the story of a luncheon between the head of the Special
Division panel, Judge David B. Sentelle, and Senator Lauch Faircloth, a conserva-
tive Republican of North Carolina and "a leader of efforts to oust Robert B. Fiske,
Jr. as the Whitewater prosecutor," while the panel was still considering its choice
of IC.50 Not unexpectedly, it was now the Democrats who took the offensive.
Senator Carl Levin, chairman of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over the IC
law, urged the Special Division to ask Judge Starr for an accounting of his recent
partisan activities and to issue an opinion stating whether he could fairly investi-
gate a Democratic President. 5' Thirty-nine House Democrats then sent a letter to
Judge Sentelle urging him to reconsider his panel's selection and expressing doubt
about the impartiality of the Special Division as well as about Judge Starr's
independence. 5
2
This drama has yielded many casualties, not least of which is the IC mechanism.
Certainly Robert Fiske was treated shabbily. Judge Starr, who was never alleged to
have been present at the suspect luncheon or to be actually involved in any
political machinations, may be the continuing victim. Most fundamentally, how-
ever, a precedent has been set: examination of the composition and political
orientation of the Special Division is now fair game for political pundits. The
Special Division, presumably keenly aware of its vital role in ensuring the
appearance of impartiality, will have a tough row to hoe. For fear of the appearance
of favoring the subject, it may well feel obliged to select someone who is not a
member of the party in power in the White House. But to avoid appearing part of a
witchhunt, it must not select someone from the opposing party who is perceived to
be too political or too hostile to the President (while also avoiding luncheon
meetings). That the Special Division will even have to consider the political
implications of its choice is perhaps evidence that the game is lost before it begins.
Recent experiences with IC investigations demonstrate further that even if the
initial appointment of an IC to investigate a politically sensitive case receives
bipartisan support, the actual conduct of the investigation will inevitably be caught
in the partisan cross-fire. The impossibility of creating the appearance of a truly
apolitical investigation in politically charged cases may find its genesis in the IC
statute itself. The statute, by its very existence, endorses in the public mind
whatever questions it held about professional government prosecutors' ability to
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. David Johnston, Three Judges Spurn Protest on Whitewater Prosecutor, N.Y. TMES, Aug. 19, 1994, at
A16.
52. Id.
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achieve a just and unbiased result where politics overshadow a particular case.53
The statutory presumption that political considerations are sufficiently powerful to
override professional and ethical obligations in high-profile cases is not, however,
logically confined to DOJ personnel. The high visibility and political importance
of IC investigations has encouraged politicians to apply it publicly to ICs when it is
in their partisan interest to do so.
The administration and its allies obviously have every interest in appearing
cooperative while attacking as biased or incompetent any IC who actually
uncovers criminal conduct worthy of indictment. Conversely, the opposing politi-
cal party has every incentive to keep the case in the news, to press for a result
discrediting the person under investigation and the administration with which that
person is affiliated, and to create grave questions about the impartiality or
judgment of an IC who exonerates the subject. As a practical matter, once a case
has been officially stamped too politically charged for a professional DOJ
prosecutor to handle, the case has been rendered too politically charged for
partisans to allow the judgment of any prosecutor to be accepted without question.
Perhaps the best case in point is the Iran-Contra investigation. The claim that the
appointment of a nonpartisan figure of great repute will ensure that the investiga-
tion appears to be "above politics" is refuted by two words: "Lawrence Walsh."
The ran-contra investigation proved the impossibility of taking a politically
sensitive case 'above politics.' Here we had a special prosecutor of the
president's own party, with a long history of moderation and professionalism, a
respected and independent figure with a lifetime of achievement in law
practice and public service. Surely, his conclusions would be respected by all.
Hardly. When Judge Walsh began to conclude the president's men were
crooks, he was vilified by the president's allies (spearheaded by the Wall Street
Journal) as politically motivated and biased. Judge Walsh was predictably
defended as impartial by Democrats, but he was no more able to escape
imputations of bias than regular prosecutors would have been. Indeed, Judge
Walsh became a political symbol.54
53. As Former Attorney General Katzenbach stated, the law,
contrary to its purpose, has served to destroy rather than preserve public confidence in the integrity
of government in general and the Department of Justice in particular. The statute assumes
conclusively that with respect to a broad range of senior government officials the Attorney General
cannot be trusted to enforce the law objectively ... and that in all such instances judges should
appoint Independent Counsel to replace the Attorney General.
S. REP. No. 101, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1993); see also id. (statement of Sen. Dole) ("We're not enhancing
'confidence in government' when Congress presumes, as it presumes through the independent counsel statute, that
the Attorney General lacks the integrity to conduct a fair and thorough investigation of another executive branch
official."); Joseph diGenova, Investigated to Death, N.Y. TtMES, Dec. 5, 1995, at A25 (former Independent
Counsel) ("When the public is told again and again that the Justice Department cannot be trusted to investigate a
matter, the executive branch is hurt.").
54. Lynch & Howard, supra note 42, at C7; see also, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Against the Independent Counsel,
COMMENTARY, Feb. 1993, at 22 (discussing Judge Walsh's indictment of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
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The irony is inescapable that the perceived importance of the statute designed to
remove politics from the criminal process may actually intensify the politicization
of investigations involving high-ranking officials. That politicization, in turn, may
serve to defeat the very purpose of the statute, promoting public confidence in the
fairness and reliability of the results of such investigations.
THE FAIR, EQUITABLE AND IMPARTIAL ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Even if the statute may, in actual practice, encourage the creation of as many
"appearance" problems as it eliminates in politically sensitive cases, perhaps the
IC statute can actually be justified in that it will likely, in the average case, provide
"better justice" than is available through other means.
It is my belief that it does not. As the following discussion illustrates, the statute
gives an IC an excess of time, means and incentive to pursue a far greater number
of people, over a wider investigatory landscape, with less justification, and at
greater human, financial and institutional cost than is reasonably necessary to
promote the reality, or appearance, of evenhanded justice. In most cases, DOJ
prosecutors, who have a necessarily broader focus and are privy to a store of
institutional knowledge and experience, are better positioned to exercise their
discretion in a professional and equitable manner, and are accountable if they do
not.
"Covered Persons"
As explored above, in cases where considerations of politics may be perceived
to compromise the Executive Branch investigation of high-ranking officials, the
invocation of the IC mechanism may be justified but may also ultimately be
counterproductive. I would argue further that where the political consequence of a
particular case is not serious, the application of the IC statute is not needed. In
presumptively covering persons by reference to their office and not distinguishing
among cases by reference to their actual political importance to the President or the
success of an administration, however, the heavy artillery of the IC statute is often
brought to bear upon persons and cases that do not warrant it in terms of any
realistic likelihood of the actual or perceived subversion of justice.
While acknowledging that even during Watergate DOJ employees acted profes-
sionally, proponents of broad presumptive coverage argue that not in every case
four days before the 1982 presidential election on a count that was later dismissed, and asserting that "[a]ny
regular prosecutor, accountable to a superior, would undoubtedly be called on the carpet, and probably
discharged, for what looks remarkably like a partisan attempt to influence the outcome of a presidential
election"), reprinted in 139 CONG. REc. S15,870 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993); Dole Urges InquiryAbout Prosecutor,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1992, at A13 ("Speaking on the CBS program 'Face the Nation,' Mr. Dole, the Senate
minority leader, called the special prosecutor's office 'a Democratic hotbed of Democratic activist lawyers.' He
argued that a special prosecutor from the Justice Department should be designated to determine 'whether or not
politics played any part' in a new indictment of Caspar W. Weinberger.").
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can one count upon having persons of integrity making the hard choices faced by
the justice department officials and special prosecutors in Watergate. Their
apparent belief is that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. This is an
issue that empirical study is unlikely to resolve; whether the Attorney General can
be counted upon to refer politically sensitive matters involving "covered persons"
on an ad hoc basis and whether the average DOJ prosecutor will in future generally
act responsibly in such investigations cannot be demonstrated, nor can public
confidence in hypothetical case results be tested. Where one stands on the question
of presumptive coverage, then, depends to a certain extent upon one's perspective
and experience. My own conclusion (which I freely concede is colored by my
experiences in the Southern District of New York, where Assistants' political
affiliations were unremarked and completely irrelevant to the assignment or
conduct of cases) is that it is far more reasonable to assume that Executive Branch
prosecutors will be fair and professional than not. Further, as is argued at greater
length within, the ounce of prevention bought by over-use of the statute may well
be more costly than should be acceptable and the cure-letting the political
processes work to correct any problems-may have its own value.
Watergate demonstrated both that it is reasonable to trust "regular" DOJ
prosecutors to act professionally even in the most politically sensitive case,55 and
that the system (Congress, the Attorney General, the public and the press) can in
general be counted upon to ensure that the criminal system works as it should.56
Examples of indifference to political considerations in the U.S. Attorneys' Offices
also are not hard to come by.57 While one cannot discount entirely the possibility
55. Ironically, had Special Counsel not been appointed in Watergate, the scandal may have proved the best
example of why such counsel is unnecessary. According to those involved, the initial investigation of the
Watergate break-in was conducted by Earl Silbert and his colleagues in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District
of Columbia. Bork, supra note 54, at S 15,868. These Executive Branch prosecutors had issued a wide-ranging
subpoena for White House documents and were researching the constitutionality of indicting a President before
impeachment. Id. However, when Elliott Richardson was nominated as the new Attorney General, Congress urged
him to appoint what was then called a special prosecutor to get to the truth. He agreed and appointed Archibald
Cox under DOJ regulatory authority. Id. Mr. Silbert gave Mr. Cox about 90 type-written pages outlining the
conspiracy and the evidence. Id. According to then Solicitor General Bork, "[w]ore work remained to be done,
but the essential outline of the case was there. Watergate would have played out about the way it did had the U.S.
Attorney's Office been allowed to continue." Id.
56. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
57. Spiro Agnew was brought down by Assistant U.S. Attorneys in Maryland. John Mitchell and Maurice
Stans were indicted by regular DOJ employees in New York. "It was one of Rudy Giuliani's assistants, not an
'independent' prosecutor, who called sitting Attorney General Ed Meese, his own boss, a 'sleaze' in a prosecution
of one of Meese's closest friends." In Washington D.C., "Eric H. Holder Jr. had promised his political affiliation
would make no difference, and anyone would find it hard to argue that the Democratic U.S. Attorney had gone
easy in seeking and securing a 17-count indictment against House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan
Rostenkowski," Kenneth J. Cooper, U.S. Attorney, A Democrat, Brings Judicial Experience to the Prosecutor's
Task, WASH. POST, June 1, 1994, at A15, who was counted as critical to the legislative initiatives of the
administration that appointed Holder. See id (Pres. Clinton was counting on Rep. Rostenkowski to guide health
care legislation through Congress); Kenneth J. Cooper, A High Profile and High Stakes for Prosecutor, WASH.
PoST, April 29, 1994, at A25 (same).
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of an Executive Branch prosecutor responding improperly to political incentives or
pressures, experience demonstrates that it is more reasonable to assume that she
will not do so than that she will. Further, when one examines the incentives of
professional prosecutors and federal investigators, it does not make sense to
presume that the political credentials of such persons as the Commissioner of the
IRS, the Deputy Director of the CIA and the entire cabinet mean that investigations
into allegations of wrongdoing by those persons-particularly allegations that may
concern conduct unrelated to their official duties--cannot be handled fairly by the
DOJ and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices.
Regardless of the scope or target of a prosecutor's ambitions, if she is
reasonably bright she will know that there is no surer way of blighting a promising
legal career than being implicated in any activity smacking of the perversion of
justice for political ends. It is exceedingly unlikely that a prosecutor would
undertake career suicide in consideration for the possible future benevolence of
Henry Cisneros, Theodore Olson, Hamilton Jordon, or Michael Espy, or the
questionable gratitude of their superiors. Indeed, if ambition plays a role, it
probably would be better served by indicting a big name official than by
exonerating him.
Even if one assumes the worst about the prosecutors assigned to the investiga-
tion of a "covered person," it is important to recognize that federal prosecutors
cannot act in complete isolation and secrecy. Those prosecutors with a political axe
to grind will be surrounded by those who do not. Further, the FBI or other
governmental investigators will be involved. The likelihood of a successful
coverup grows exceedingly dim when one considers that federal investigators are
hired and promoted for their investigatory achievements, not their political views,
and that their self-interest most decidedly counsels against being party to a betrayal
of their office.
One could, of course, argue that unethical prosecutors and agents may decide
that the risks of discovery and exposure are small and that the rewards to be
garnered from grateful politicians are worth the risk. Assuming that such rewards
would be politically feasible and not in and of themselves evidence of a white-
wash, it would seem that the conspiratorial cabal could only reasonably believe
that their actions would go unexamined in the least visible and least politically
important cases-that is, cases in which the conspiracy is least likely to be
worthwhile. It is difficult to credit, at least in today's environment, that political
foes of the subject of the investigation, the witnesses who raised the allegations in
the first instance, the press, and Congress will simply turn a blind eye to the
prosecutor's progress or lack thereof in a high-profile case involving politically
sensitive charges.
Finally, one may argue that the concern is not that the line prosecutors or
investigating agents are willing to "throw" a case for personal gain but rather that
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the President or other high-ranking officials may be sufficiently corrupt to attempt
to quash a meritorious investigation for personal or political reasons. If the
Saturday Night Massacre taught us anything, it demonstrates the political impossi-
bility of a President or Attorney General taking such action overtly. It also seems to
me that for all the reasons stated above, covert efforts would meet with little
success. In addition to professional and ethical considerations, the self-interest of
the many people participating in or aware of the investigation will likely lie in
exposing rather than acquiescing in any coverup. Further, while one cannot say
that a covert "fix" is impossible, it would seem likely to succeed only in cases not
extensively monitored by the press or administration foes-that is, cases in which
the conduct or target under investigation lack strong ties to the President or
Attorney General. Yet these are the cases least likely to invite high-level obstruc-
tion of justice, given that administration officials are unlikely to risk the enormous
political damage that would ensue if the whitewash were exposed if such strong
political or personal ties are absent.
Nor can it be argued that the "appearance" of evenhanded justice requires
presumptive coverage even if the "reality" does not. Although I would posit that
the lessons of history are ultimately to the contrary, I am willing to assume that the
public perception (fed by partisan politics) may be that the President or Attorney
General have too much power and influence over the DOJ for even a well-meaning
DOJ Attorney to handle investigations regarding. those persons fairly and impar-
tially. However, I do not believe this assumption valid with respect to the balance
of persons presumptively covered under the statute. While a particular "covered
person" may have sufficient personal or political connections to a President or
Attorney General to create (or generate political incentives to create) questions
about the DOJ's impartial administration of a criminal investigation targeting that
person, this is the exceptional case that should be the subject of ad hoc IC
appointments rather than the rule warranting presumptive coverage. Again, this is
a matter not easily verified but I, for one, doubt that the public perceives the DOJ to
be incapable of fairly investigating whether Carter campaign aid official Timothy
Kraft engaged in recreational drug use or, if the general public was even aware of
the controversy, whether DOJ official Theodore Olson made misleading state-
ments to Congress. Moreover, in these cases it seems that the "public confidence"
sought is formed largely by press coverage, which in turn is shaped by the political
dynamic. Where a case does not involve politically sensitive allegations involving
persons close to the President or Attorney General and is dealt with in the normal
manner by DOJ, it is unlikely to warrant the extended attention of politicians and
the press or to create partisan incentives to undermine publicly the ultimate
judgment of DOJ investigators. Indeed, the availability of the IC mechanism may
actually create incentives to politicize these cases. It appears that such investiga-
tions as "Passportgate" attain more public credibility and political importance
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because of the appointment of an IC and the publicity that surrounds the IC process
than because of their intrinsic interest to the public.
Referral Mechanism
Not only is the list of "covered persons" as to whom DOJ is presumptively
deemed conflicted too broad,5 8 but the statutory trigger is designed so that the
Attorney General has little choice but to over-refer cases for appointment of an IC.
The words of the standard provide little real guidance: the Attorney General must
refer a matter to the Special Division for appointment of an IC if the preliminary
investigation reveals that there are "reasonable grounds to believe that further
investigation or prosecution is warranted. ' ' 59 The politicization of the referral
process creates an incentive for the Attorney General to interpret and apply this
vague standard to include cases in which an IC appointment is unnecessary to
further the fair administration of justice.
Demands for an IC have become political weapons because they not only ensure
that allegations of wrongdoing by political allies of the President receive maxi-
mum and continuing press coverage, they also put the administration in a political
bind. A refusal to refer the allegations to the Special Division will be good for yet
more adverse publicity, and may actually result in a greater political black eye than
would a referral and subsequent investigation. One could argue that an Attorney
General may, particularly in light of the Whitewater experience, determine that
taking a short-term political penalty in very high-profile cases may be better than
inviting a continuing political hemorrhage. In the more ordinary case, however, it
seems likely that an Attorney General faced with allegations of wrongdoing by
administration officials such as those raised in the Espy or Cisneros cases may feel
pressured to over-refer in order to counter any perception that she is obstructing
justice.6°
Further, Congress has made it difficult for the DOJ to probe whether or not an
allegation has any real legs. The statute prohibits the Attorney General from
issuing subpoenas or using the grand jury or other investigative methods in
establishing whether the threshold standard is met,6" and requires a decision within
58. If one accepts the congressional presumption that DOJ prosecutors cannot be counted upon to act fairly
with respect to those politically important to the administration, the list of presumptively conflicted persons must
also be deemed underinclusive for not including the President's leading congressional supporters. The issue of
including Congress within the presumptive coverage of the Act has been raised and rejected, principally because,
it was asserted, Congress is not part of the Executive Branch and is therefore not subject to the intra-executive
"institutional" conflict of interest targeted in the statute. See S. REP. No. 101, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1993).
However, the structure of the Act, which includes as covered persons campaign officials not working within the
Executive Branch while omitting lower rank and file employees of the Executive, tells us that it is the political
connections of the covered persons, not the source of their paycheck, that is the genesis of the perceived conflict.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1)(A) (1994).
60. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 701-703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(2)(A) (1994).
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90 days.62 Perhaps most important, the principal question in many of these cases,
involving as they do such alleged violations as false statements, obstruction, or the
transgression of one of a raft of federal regulations governing the conduct of public
officials, will be whether the conduct at issue was inadvertent or negligent as
opposed to knowing and intentional. The Attorney General, however, must refer
each and every such violation as to which further investigation may be warranted
unless she has "clear and convincing evidence" that the subject lacked the
requisite criminal state of mind.63 The Attorney General, barred from the most
effective means of gathering evidence, will rarely if ever be able to reach such a
conclusion. A conscientious application of the statutory standard, then, will require
the referral of many cases involving unintentional or inadvertent violations that
ultimately should not warrant criminal prosecution.
These constraints reflect a congressional unease with the statute's requirement,
adopted in response to constitutional imperatives, that no IC can be appointed
absent the specific request of the Attorney General. 64 The Attorney General must
comply with the statutory referral standard, but her decision as to the application of
that standard in a given case is final and unreviewable by the courts. 65 In response
to the failure of an Attorney General to refer matters to the Special Division in
instances where Congress felt such referrals were warranted, Congress has
66
constrained the scope of the Attorney General's statutory referral discretion.
What is ironic is that Congress' efforts do not change the fact that an Attorney
General still has the unreviewable poweri to refuse to make a referral for
illegitimate reasons-for example, because an IC investigation would be politi-
cally injurious to the administration. All that Congress has succeeded in doing,
then, is forcing an Attorney General who is committed to the principled application
of the statute to refer a great many more cases than the purposes of the statute
require.67
62. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(1).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(2)(B)(ii).
64. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. 511, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1994) ("Congress believes that the Attorney
General should rarely close a matter under the independent counsel law based upon finding a lack of criminal
intent, due to the subjective judgments required and the limited role accorded the Attorney General in the
independent counsel process. Congress also believes that at least one Attorney General abused his authority in this
area, that this abuse was the impetus for the statutory restriction in the expired law, and that a statutory restriction
remains necessary to prevent future problems."); S. REP. No. 123, 100th Cong., I st Sess. 9-12 (1987) (restrictions
designed to limit DOJ discretion); H.R. REP. No. 316, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-27 (1987) (same); 133 CONG.
REc. S30,497 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum) (describing Attorney General Meese's
failure to request an independent counsel to investigate charges against persons with whom he had personally
associated); Harriger, supra note 30, at 84-85, 88.
67. It may be worth noting that, as of the time of the 1994 reenactment of the statute, Congress reported upon
the results of thirteen IC appointments. S. REP. No. 101, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1993). Fully nine of the
thirteen resulted in no indictments (IC investigations regarding Hamilton Jordan, Timothy Kraft, Raymond
Donovan, Edwin Meese III, Theodore Olson, three subjects whose identities are confidential, and the "Passport-
gate" affair). Id.
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Selection of the IC
Once the Attorney General refers a matter to the Special Division, that Division
has complete discretion to choose the IC.6' The Special Division's choice is
obviously important to the statutory end of promoting the appearance of impartial-
ity. The identity of the IC is also critical to ensuring a fair, professional and
expeditious resolution of the matter referred. It is this person who, as is discussed
at greater length below, will wield the enormous and virtually unchecked powers
of the IC office. Further, it is important to note that the statute simply provides for
the judicial appointment of an IC, not his team.69 The statute provides no guidance
regarding the composition of, or qualifications for, members of an IC's staff. The
IC can choose to work on a part-time basis and delegate important decisions to
persons whose selection is solely within his discretion and who are apparently
accountable only to him. The identity of the IC is important, then, not only because
his own reputation and performance will affect the success of the investigation, but
also because his staff selections, delegation decisions, and supervision of the staff
will be both critical to the responsible conduct of the investigation and within his
sole discretion.
The sum total of qualifications provided by Congress for a position whose
power equals that of the Attorney General within its sphere 70 is the directive that
the Special Division "appoint as independent counsel an individual who has the
appropriate experience and who will conduct the investigation and any prosecution
in a prompt, responsible, and cost-effective manner.", 71 How the Special Division
chooses to read this vague mandate is not subject to challenge; its appointment
decision is not reviewable by the courts, nor is this appointment, like a presidential
nomination of an Attorney General, subject to Senate investigation and approval. I
submit that the congressional mandate is deficient in at least two critical respects.
First, given the importance in high-profile IC cases of bringing the investigation
to a speedy conclusion, the statute should require that an IC devote his full time
and energies to the IC office. Although in the normal case the duration of an
investigation may only affect the subjects of the investigation, in the IC context
timing considerations may have far more wide-reaching consequences. Especially
in cases involving the President and those close to him, the effective conduct of the
business of the Executive Branch may be impaired until the case is resolved. The
investigation will not only distract and burden those individuals subject to its
scrutiny, it may also divert the public debate from matters of important public
policy to matters of as yet unproven public scandal. IC timing decisions also may
actually skew the political process; decisions regarding such matters as the timing
68. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 593 (1994).
70. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(2) (1994).
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of grand jury appearances, indictments and the issuance of IC reports can affect the
outcome of elections. Finally, given the unique public spotlight trained upon
subjects of IC investigations, basic fairness dictates that allegations of wrongdoing
be resolved with dispatch.
It is true that investigations proceed in fits and starts, and that an IC matter may
not require the undivided attention of the IC throughout its course. However,
appearances, which are deemed so important in this context, require appointment
of a full-time IC in politically charged cases at the heart of the statute even if the
reality is that the investigation may proceed expeditiously with a part-time IC. The
statutory object is, of course, to ensure public confidence in the results of
politically sensitive IC investigations. To achieve this, confidence in the IC himself
must remain untarnished throughout the process. An IC who appears to place a
lesser priority on a high-profile investigation than on his own law practice will
inevitably open himself up to partisan attacks; even if he is in actual fact
conscientiously doing all that is necessary to further the IC investigation, no one
will know that but the IC and his team. The concurrent private practice of law also
provides fertile ground for allegations of conflicts of interest. Again, the reality
may be that no such conflicts exist, but the perception, once planted, can be mined
by those with an interest in discrediting the eventual results of an investigation.
Congress, in rejecting a proposal to require full-time IC appointments, ex-
pressed fear that this requirement would deter many qualified lawyers from
undertaking IC service.7 2 This concern only arises because of the overbroad
coverage of the statute; were the statute invoked more sparingly, fewer ICs would
be needed and the allure of the appointment would be significantly greater. Many
lawyers may be unwilling to dedicate themselves full-time to determining whether
Hamilton Jordan engaged in recreational drug use, partly because the investigation
likely would not absorb their full energies and partly because the matter may not be
of sufficient public import to draw them from their practices. Were the statute's
coverage confined to cases in which the DOJ genuinely may appear to be
conflicted-for example, where the subject is the President or the Attorney
General-it is difficult to believe that the Special Division could not find
outstanding candidates willing to undertake a full-time appointment.
Second, Congress does not deem it necessary that the "appropriate experience"
qualification required by the statute include a stint in a prosecutor's office. It would
seem, however, that just as one seeking to hire an attorney to defend one in a
high-profile criminal case would not turn to, for example, a trusts and estates
attorney,73 neither should the government entrust an important and time-sensitive
investigation to a criminal-law novice. It must be conceded that it is difficult to
enforce a requirement that the candidate's prosecutorial experience be meaningful,
72. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 452, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1987).
73. No offense intended to my colleagues practicing in this area of the bar.
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and that many a talented novice may in time outshine the most experienced
professional prosecutor. The key considerations here, however, seem to me to be
credibility and timing. A former prosecutor with a distinguished record of being
both fair and aggressive may not only have more initial credibility with the public,
he may also depend to some extent upon that reputation to shield his credibility
when he makes tough and politically objectionable decisions. More important, an
IC may not have the time to learn on the job. He will be called upon promptly after
appointment to make important and delicate prosecutorial strategy calls, such as
how to order the conduct of the investigation; when and to whom to offer
cooperation and immunity deals; whether critical evidence is likely to be admitted
and, if so, whether it is sufficient to support a conviction; and whether indictments
are consistent with not only the evidence and the law but also the public interest
and DOJ policies and practices applied to the average citizen. These strategy calls
require the exercise of judgment based upon experience. While the criminal law is
not high science unknowable by any but practitioners of long standing, one with
little acquaintance with the criminal processes, no matter how bright, well-
meaning or industrious, will face a steep learning curve and may well make
mistakes in these matters of no small consequence to the successful conclusion of
the investigation.
Investigation
In the conduct of the investigation, the IC holds a blank check.74 Especially
significant is the amount of personnel that an IC can employ to investigate and
prosecute the sole matter entrusted to him, which is often vastly disproportionate
to that which the DOJ would normally allocate to the same case in the normal
course. 75 An IC may employ as many prosecutors, investigators, and support
personnel, and use as many other resources, as he or she wishes. An IC is the only
prosecutor in the country who is by statute entitled to call upon all the vast
resources of the federal government without providing any justification, without
assuming responsibility for funding shortfalls, and without worrying about compet-
ing demands upon available resources.
The unlimited resources available to an IC not only result in perceived inequities
74. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
75. See Hearing on H.R. 811 Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act Before the Subcommittee on
Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (March 3, 1993) (statement of Terrence O'Donnell, Esq., Williams & Connolly) ("By
our count 70 lawyers have served in the Walsh office since he began six long years ago. In the North case alone, 40
IC lawyers appeared on the pleadings. More than 50 FBI, IRS and Customs agents were dispatched around the
globe to gather evidence. While the average assistant U.S. Attorney (one lawyer) handles more than 100 cases per
year, the entire Walsh staff produced 14 pleas or indictments in six years. And when the Walsh army was deemed
inadequate, they brought in the reserves-former federal judges and law professor consultants from Harvard,
Virginia and Columbia. These numbers give one the sense of the enormous and disproportionate fire power
focused on a handful of individuals.").
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in treatment between public officials and average citizens, they also may well skew
the exercise of an IC's prosecutorial discretion in significant ways. Many statutes
applicable to the white collar offenses that are generally the subject of IC
investigation, such as the wire and mail fraud statutes, are capable of very creative
and novel interpretation by a prosecutor who seeks to make a case. The thicket of
regulations applicable to federal officials is also such that de minimus violations
often may be unearthed with sufficient time, manpower and incentive. The
constraints upon resources generally available to "normal" federal prosecutors
ensure that the criminal process will be effectively reserved for egregious viola-
tions in which criminal rather than civil prosecution is clearly appropriate. Where
resource allocation is not an issue, such as in an IC investigation, no such
constraints exist to separate the truly criminal transgression from the case more
reasonably and equitably treated through civil sanctions.
The IC enjoys not only virtually unlimited means, he also enjoys virtually
unlimited time (absent statute of limitations problems) in which to exploit those
means. To be sure, DOJ investigators also may take whatever time they need to
investigate and prosecute a case, subject only to statute of limitations concerns.
The IC's temporal license is of greater concern, however, both because of the
compelling reasons, explored above, for the prompt disposition of IC matters and
because the IC statute creates an unique incentive for ICs to exploit their license
unnecessarily. The IC must file a final report at the conclusion of his investigation,
while DOJ policy forbids similar comment in the normal case.76 As a practical
matter, the existence of a final reporting requirement virtually ensures that the IC
will tax his blank check to the utmost and that the investigation will be unnecessar-
ily prolonged.
The final report was conceived by Congress as the means to " 'ensure the
accountability' of the IC to the government of the United States and to the public
by providing 'a detailed and official record of the activities of the [independent
counsel] which may be reviewed and analyzed at the appropriate time.' "" Given
that the report is designed to serve as the means by which the IC's results are
publicly graded, any rational IC will recognize its importance in forming the
judgment of history on his or her performance. Further, given the political
76. "Requiring a prosecutor to file a final report that may become a public document is unique to the
independent counsel process." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 511, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1994). "'Details of
non-independent counsel investigations within the Department that do not result in an indictment or plea, are
confidential. There are no reports filed with a court or any other outside body.... In some cases, where there has
been a substantial amount of media attention, the Department will send a letter or call the subject's counsel stating
that the investigation has ended without any charges being filed. The Department will then either make no public
statement or limit its public statement to the fact that the investigation is over without charges being filed."
A.B.A., SEc. oF CRim. JUST. REP. TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES-RECOMMENDATION 12 (Aug. 1993).
77. In re North, 16 F.3d 1234,1238 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div. 1994) (quoting S. REP. No. 170,95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 70-71 (1978)).
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consequences of his conclusions, an IC must expect that those partisans likely to be
unhappy with his results will be lining up to attack publicly the investigation as
incomplete and the report's conclusions as biased or unsubstantiated. An IC, then,
has an incentive to conduct his investigation in part with the final report in mind
and to use the final report to justify his actions and counter any potential criticisms.
The report, in short, gives an IC every reason to first overinvestigate and then
overexplain, both of which will needlessly burden the public fisc and prolong the
investigation.
The Whitewater investigation once again provides a worthy case in point. Judge
Starr has recently been taken to task by some commentators for the length and
apparent depth of his investigation.78 One cannot blame Judge Starr, however, for
responding to the pressures created by the statute, by politicians, and, of course, by
the press itself. Judge Starr can hardly ignore the criticism levelled at his
predecessor's reports-criticism that, not unexpectedly, seemed to follow strict
party lines. He knows that he will be treated to even more of the same politically
motivated fire unless he is able to demonstrate that he looked at every scrap of
paper, relevant or not; talked to every conceivable witness, and then some; and in
short pursued each and every crackpot avenue that any conspiracy theorist could
imaginably posit. He is, in essence, damned if he does (for taking his time) and
damned if he doesn't (for not finding a smoking gun that does not exist) because it
is good politics to abuse him either way, and good press to follow it. A "normal"
DOJ prosecutor or U.S. Attorney does not have similar means nor, given the policy
against reporting on declined cases, similar incentives; she simply could not be
effective in dealing with the many cases for which she is responsible if she
squanders scarce resources on pursuing improbable theories or looking for crimes
that likely did not happen and that may not be worth prosecuting if they did.
Jurisdiction
The fact that the IC may only employ these resources within the jurisdiction
granted him by the Special Division does not contain the problem. The Special
Division is required by statute to confer jurisdiction sufficient to "assure that the
independent counsel has adequate authority to fully investigate the subject matter
... and all matters related to that subject matter."79 Not surprisingly, the Special
Division has provided ICs with very broadly worded jurisdictional mandates,'
and the courts have been willing to accept a very permissive reading of what
78. Stuart Taylor, Jr., lime of Testing for Kenneth Starr, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 12, 1996, at 25.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(3) (1994) (Emphasis added).
80. See, e.g., In re: Alphonso Michael (Mike) Espy, No. 94-2, Order at t-2 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div. Sept.
9, 1994); In re Madison Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Div. No. 94-1, Order at 1-2 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div. Aug.
5, 1994); In re: Oliver L. North, et al., Div. No. 86-6, Order at 1-2 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div. Dec. 19, 1986).
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"related" matters ICs may legitimately pursue within those mandates. 81
Indeed, the Special Division recently referred what it concluded was a "related"
case 82 to Independent Counsel Donald C. Smaltz over the objection of the
Attorney General that the matter was not in fact related to, and thus encompassed
within, Mr. Smaltz's original jurisdictional grant.83 The Special Division con-
cluded that, to meet constitutional requirements, a matter referred by the Special
Division to an IC pursuant to that IC's request under section 594(e) of the statute
must be "demonstrably related" to the original jurisdictional grant, and that such
relatedness " 'depends upon the procedural and factual link between the OIC's
original prosecutorial jurisdiction and the matter sought to be referred.' -"84 It is
difficult to determine from the Special Division's discussion the precise procedural
or factual connection between the matters originally conferred upon Mr. Smaltz
and the matters sought to be investigated. It appears from the discussion, however,
that neither the "precise factual matters" at issue nor the persons whose conduct is
sought to be investigated were named in the original order.
8 5
The implication this reader drew from the order is that the additional allegations
concerned persons who worked closely with Secretary Espy at Agriculture and
may have engaged in similar patterns of alleged misbehavior.8 6 Notably, however,
there is no statement in the order that these persons are alleged to have conspired or
acted in concert with Secretary Espy.8 7 There is also no explicit response to the
DOJ's apparent argument that this referral is not necessary to advance the
investigation of the principal matter referred.88 Nor does the order suggest that the
persons at issue are "covered persons" within the meaning of the statute. Perhaps I
am drawing too much from what is unstated in the order but it appears that the
Special Division considers a matter to be "related" simply when it comes to the
IC's attention during the course of his investigation and involves similar witnesses,
alleged patterns of conduct and applicable law.
Concerned as we are with the practical operation of the statute, the questions
whether the Special Division's application of the relatedness standard is consistent
81. See In re: Alphonso Michael (Mike) Espy, No. 94-2, slip op. at 10-14 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div. Apr. 1,
1996) (approving IC's determination that matter is related); United States v. Tucker, No. 95-3268, 1996 WL
112414, at *6-8 (8th Cir. Mar. 15, 1996) (relatedness is "exceedingly broad"); see also In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas Duces Tecum, Nos. 95-3279, 3282, 1996 WL 112411, at *4(8th Cir. Mar. 15, 1996) (new allegations
"unquestionably related" to original jurisdiction); In re Olson, 818 F2d 34, 47-48 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div.
1987) (investigation of other persons is related).
82. See supra note 17 (discussing power of Special Division to make referral).
83. In re: Alphonso Michael (Mike) Espy, No. 94-2, slip op. at 10-14 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div. Apr. 1,
1996).
84. Id. at 11 (quoting Tucker, 1996 WL 112414, at *7).
85. In re Espy, No. 94-2, slip op. at 12-13; see also id. at 2 (text of the order).
86. Id. at 12-13.
87. Cf In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34, 48 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div. 1987) (IC's jurisdiction to investigate
conspiracy encompasses authority to investigate others involved in alleged conspiracy).
88. See In Re Espy, No. 94-2, slip op. at 13.
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with Article III, separation of powers principles, 9 and the Division's own
precedents 90 are beyond the scope of this essay. There are valid practical argu-
ments for reading the "related" jurisdiction of an IC fairly broadly where such
"related" matters have been referred by the Attorney General and thus are unlikely
to compromise any ongoing DOJ investigations and where the related jurisdiction,
although not central to the original case, is necessary to further the resolution of
that case, for example by allowing the IC to pressure the "related" persons to
cooperate in the investigation of the principal case. What is troubling is that, in
practical effect, the Smaltz referral seems to have exceeded even these expansive
bounds and thus established a precedent that stretches the concept of "relatedness"
to its breaking point. Attorney General Reno has not proved grudging either in her
referrals of cases to the Special Division as an initial matter or in her subsequent
willingness to refer additional "related" matters to existing ICs. 9' Nonetheless, the
Special Division overruled this Attorney General's "relatedness" determination
apparently where (1) there was no allegation of a conspiracy tying the pattern of
conduct in the referred matter to the principal matter; (2) the referred matter was
not demonstrably justified as necessary to further the primary investigation; and
(3) the referred matter brought within the IC's mandate persons who apparently are
not "covered persons" and thus whose investigation by an IC is not, even under
the statutory conflict presumptions applied to "covered persons," required by the
purposes of the statute. The DOJ may not be far off when it objected that referrals
of such matters give an "independent counsel unlimited jurisdiction and power to
prosecute anyone whose path may have crossed that of the named subject of the
investigation."
92
A final note is in order regarding the difficulty of enforcement of whatever
jurisdictional constraints may be in place. If the Attorney General determines that a
89. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 679-81, 695-96 (1988).
90. See In re Olson, 818 F.2d at 47-48 (holding that where an Attorney General had determined that there were
no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation was warranted with respect to a matter under section
592(b)(1), and later rejected an IC's request that the Attorney General refer the matter as "related" to the IC's
primary jurisdiction under section 594(e), the Special Division has no authority to refer the matter to the IC under
594(e); further ruling that while the IC's original jurisdictional grant was broad enough to permit inquiry into
whether the persons sought to be referred conspired with the person under IC investigation to obstruct the
investigation, it did not give the IC authority to prosecute those persons); see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685 n.22
("We express no view on the merits of the Division's interpretation of the original grant or of its ruling in regard to
its power to refer matters that the Attorney General has previously refused to refer.").
91. In addition to the Whitewater referral, Attorney General Reno has referred to the Special Division for
appointment of ICs allegations regarding former Agriculture Secretary Michael Espy, Commerce Secretary
Ronald Brown, and Housing and Urban Development Secretary Henry Cisneros. She has also referred two
"related" matters to Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, Nos.
95-3279, 95-3282, 1996 WL 112411, at *3-4 (8th Cir. Mar. 15, 1996) (referral of campaign contribution issues);
United States v. Tucker, No. 95-3268, 1996 WL 112414, at *2 (8th Cir. Mar. 15, 1996) (referral of bankruptcy
issue); see also 139 CONG. REc. S 15,846 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993) (remarks of Sen. Cohen) ("Attorney General
Reno is one of the first confirmed Attorneys General who has come out in favor of [the IC statute]").
92. In Re Espy, No. 94-2, slip op. at 13.
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matter is "related" and refers it to an IC, that referral is not subject to judicial
review.93 If, over the objection of the Attorney General and at the behest of the IC,
the Special Division expands (by way of an inappropriate referral) the jurisdiction
of the IC, there may be no timely remedy. The subjects of the allegedly "related"
matter may not even know that they are subjects. If they do, it is very unlikely that
they will be given access to the investigative information upon which the IC will
argue his "relatedness" case. Without such access, the subjects cannot rebut IC
assertions regarding commonality of witnesses or "patterns" of wrongdoing, and
they therefore cannot meaningfully contest the merits of the jurisdictional dispute.
Further, assuming that the subjects are equipped to argue the case on the merits,
they may not have standing to do so."4 Finally, the statute contains no provision for
how or where an appeal as of right may be taken by such subjects. Similarly, in a
case where the Special Division overrides an Attorney General's objection to
referral of a matter to an IC, there is some question as to how, and where, the DOJ
may appeal this determination.95
In sum, the scope of an IC's jurisdiction can be " 'both wide in perimeter and
fuzzy at the borders,' ,,96 and constraints upon it may be difficult to enforce. As a
consequence, subjects of IC investigations can count upon the IC having the
mandate, as well as the means and the incentive, to delve into private areas far
afield from the original inquiry. The likelihood is that with a malleable jurisdiction
mandate and so much firepower, some information of an unflattering if not
criminal nature will surface-however tangentially related to the original subject-
matter of the investigation. To compound this invasion, the IC may, unlike normal
DOJ prosecutors, record such matters in his final report and the report may be, and
generally is, made public by the Special Division.
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion
The most obvious objection to providing an IC with so much power, so many
resources, and so broad a mandate is that it may, and given the an IC's incentives
probably will, subject the targets of IC investigations to far greater scrutiny and
violate their privacy much more than would be the case if the targets were private
citizens. Certainly this is troubling where no criminal prosecution is ultimately
brought but the final report sets forth information that is sure to harm the target's
93. Tucker, 1996 WL 112414, at *2-6.
94. See In re Olson, 818 F.2d at 48 (denying motions to intervene submitted by persons sought to be referred to
IC for investigation under 594(e) because "a person challenging the authority or propriety of a criminal
investigation can do so only after an indictment (if any) is returned by the grand jury").
95. The constitutionality of the IC statute was heard on direct appeal to the D.C. Circuit from a contempt order
entered by the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) when the subjects of the investigation refused to appear
pursuant to grand jury subpoenas. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd, Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654 (1988).
96. Tucker, 1996 WL 112414, at *6 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 26 F.3d 142, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S.Ct. 1430 (1995)).
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reputation or professional standing. However, one may ask whether we should care
that the process to which a public official was subjected was more harsh and
invasive than that which a ordinary citizen would suffer if a violation is proved and
the public official is guilty. Should it bother us that the conceded misconduct
would only have been discovered through application of the extraordinary powers
of the IC? The answer is "yes" in these circumstances.
We may accept the argument that all prosecutions are to some degree selective
and that a prosecution is not illegitimate simply because the government discov-
ered this one offense but did not detect, or chose not to pursue, others. It is quite
another thing to "selectively" target a person, set out to see if he or she ever did
anything criminal in relation to a vaguely worded mandate, and then publish any
results of this inquiry. This not only institutionalizes unequal treatment, it also
creates grave dangers to the integrity of the process. In Justice Jackson's words:
"If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his case, it follows that he can choose
his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous power of the prosecutor: that he
will pick people that he thinks he should get, rather than cases that need to be
prosecuted. With the law books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a
prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding at least a technical violation of some
act on the part of almost anyone. In such a case, it is not a question of
discovering the commission of a crime and then looking for the man who has
committed it, it is a question of picking the man and then searching the law
books, or putting investigators to work, to pin some offense on him. It is in this
realm-in which the prosecutor picks some person whom he dislikes or desires
to embarrass, or selects some group of unpopular persons and then looks for an
offense, that the greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies. It is here.
that law enforcement becomes personal, and the real crime becomes that of
being unpopular with the predominant or governing group, being attached to
the wrong political views, or being personally obnoxious to or in the way of the
prosecutor himself." 97
The dangers of inequity, then, lie not only in the perceived unfairness of treating
public officials more harshly than the average citizen, but in the potential for the
subversion of the proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion resulting from the
IC's singular focus. This singular focus "heighten[s] ... all of the occupational
hazards of the dedicated prosecutor; the danger of too narrow a focus, of the loss of
perspective, of preoccupation with the pursuit of one alleged suspect to the
exclusion of other interests." 98 Just as the extraordinary resources available to an
IC may distort the exercise of his discretion,99 an IC's single mandate makes his
97. Morrison, 478 U.S. at 728 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24
JUDICATURE 1, 19 (1940) (address delivered at the Second Annual Conference of the United States Attorneys,
April 1, 1940)).
98. Amici Curiae Brief of Edward H. Levi, Griffin B. Bell, and William French Smith at 11, Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654 (1988) (No. 87-1279).
99. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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actual indictment or declination decisions subject to a very different dynamic than
that applicable to "regular" prosecutors, with a likelihood that politicians will be
treated differently, and probably more harshly, under an IC regime than would be
the case in a DOJ investigation.
To be sure, politically charged cases inherently change the dynamics of
prosecutorial decisionmaking, even by the DOJ. The conventional wisdom is that
Executive Branch prosecutors are subject to pressure to make cases against
administration officials go away. It may be more likely, however, that DOJ
attorneys will be subject to a fair amount of pressure to indict. They may bring
marginal cases, or cases that would normally be declined or diverted, because "the
understandable effort by Attorneys General to prove they can handle these tough
cases with scrupulous fairness may produce a tendency to 'bend over backwards'
to avoid favoring the person under investigation." 00 Ambition may also fuel this
incentive; a line prosecutor may well see the case as one in which to make a name
for himself. On balance, however, it seems to me that the danger that prosecutorial
discretion will be skewed in high-profile cases is greater in an IC investigation than
in DOJ investigations. Professional Executive Branch prosecutors have the luxury
of compiling a record over time, involving myriad different matters, with which to
lend credibility to their choices in hard cases and to justify their performance to
professional peers, Congress, the press, and the public. By contrast, an IC's
performance will be assessed on the basis of the one matter referred to him, which
will certainly alter his perspective and may well alter his substantive decisions.
An IC will want to be viewed as successfully resolving the sole matter entrusted
to him, whether by indictment followed by conviction or by declination amply
justified in his final report. The IC may, as a result, decline meritorious but
hard-to-win cases that a "regular" DOJ prosecutor would (and should) bring. For
example, a responsible U.S. Attorney may well conclude that it is worthwhile to
bring a tough case involving bribery of a public official. Win or lose, he will be
able to point to his record to protect himself from a popular politician's cries of
political vendetta. An IC looking at the same case but having no record to rely
upon to shield him from the inevitable political fallout may be tempted to decline
the close case and write a report explaining why, even though the target was
probably dirty, the evidence was not strong enough to submit to a jury. The
converse is also true; a case that a U.S. Attorney may, despite plenty of evidence,
normally decline for reasons of equity or resource allocation, an IC would likely to
feel pressure to bring so as to generate a statistic to be used to justify his existence
(and expenditures) to Congress and the public.
The primary check upon these distorting forces is the same check that ensures
the responsible exercise of prosecutorial power in the normal case: the IC will not
100. S. REP. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 34-35 (1982) (supplemental remarks of Sen. Eagleton); see also
128 CONG. Ruc. S20,815 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Cohen).
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want to lose a high-profile case, either by suffering a no true bill at the grand jury
stage (an exceedingly unlikely event with a captive special grand jury) or, as is
more likely, suffering an acquittal after trial. Assuming that the IC has sufficient
knowledge and experience to weigh accurately the evidence available to him, this
check provides some counterweight to the incentives to over-indict flowing from
his singular focus. Indeed, as noted above, the IC will likely feel a great deal of
pressure not to indict unless he is sure that he has the evidence to win. However,
the fear of suffering a no true bill or acquittal cannot deter the unwarranted
declination of worthwhile cases. Nor is it likely to prevent the distortion of the
normal exercise of prosecutorial discretion in favor of indictment in the many
cases where the issue is not the quantum of evidence available, but rather whether
the public interest warrants prosecution.
U.S. Attorneys consider a number of factors in deciding whether to bring a case
that have little to do with the weight of the evidence. "Decisions on whether to
prosecute a violation of a federal criminal law on a given set of facts depend on a
variety of factors including the availability of non-criminal alternatives to prosecu-
tion, the federal interest served by prosecution, the deterrent effect of the
prosecution, the nature and seriousness of the offense, and the subject's culpability
and past record. This reasonable discretion is regularly practiced by the Depart-
ment of Justice, U.S. Attorneys, and prosecutors throughout the federal sys-
tem." 101
These considerations are largely irrelevant to an IC. As discussed, allocation of
resources is not an issue; he has unlimited time, money and personnel to pursue
one matter. The high-profile nature of the case will mean that a prosecution will
always send a message. And it has become increasingly difficult, given the intense
politicization of recent investigations, for an IC to decline to prosecute or divert a
technical or de minimis violation on the ground that the case, although supported
by the evidence, is one that probably would not have been pursued if the target of
the investigation were not a political figure.
Gerard Lynch, former Associate Counsel in two IC investigations and former
Chief of the Criminal Division in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of New York, and author Philip Howard state the case best:
Deciding to prosecute is not a simple matter of finding that a law has been
violated. It is a far more subtle decision, made against the reliable backdrop of
hundreds of other cases. Judgment and discretion are at the heart of a
prosecutor's job. In a world in which regulations are piled so high that many
well-meaning people trip over them, prosecutors must decide every day
whether a particular violation is merely technical or is one that requires the
awesome step of criminal prosecution. Decisions to prosecute are inextricably
bound up in priorities-prosecutors regularly allocate scarce resources to
101. S. REP. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1982).
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violent and drug crimes at the expense of nonviolent white-collar cases-and
necessarily draw on society's norms and values .... In the ordinary case, the
U.S. attorney has to ask himself: Is it fair to treat this case as a felony, as
compared to how we treat other, similar cases where the defendant was not
politically prominent? The special prosecutor has no such concerns. He has
only one investigation to pursue, and the unnatural intensity skews the
decision. The smallest infraction can take on a life of its own.'
0 2
In sum, the combination of the unlimited resources available to the IC and his
singular focus may well skew IC discretionary prosecution decisions, resulting in
disparate, and probably harsher, treatment of IC targets than would be the case
were their cases entrusted to the DOJ.
Knowledge and Experience
Even if an IC succeeds in overcoming these distorting influences, broadening
his frame of reference beyond the narrow confines of the matter entrusted to him,
and considering the myriad factors that normally shape a federal prosecutor's
indictment decisions, he may not have the knowledge or experience to apply his
discretion equitably.
A high-profile investigation conducted by a U.S. Attorneys Office or out of main
Justice is likely to be staffed by prosecutors experienced in criminal trial practice
and knowledgeable about the type of case at issue. Those attorneys will be
supervised by persons with even greater knowledge and experience who have
spent years making decisions on cases of the same criminal character. Knowing the
facts of prior cases, and the considerations driving previous indictment decisions,
they will at least have a basis for comparing the high-profile case with less
notorious prosecutions. This fund of knowledge and experience is not necessarily
something shared by ICs.
The congressional exhortation that ICs follow DOJ policies, and confer with
DOJ and local U.S. Attorneys to determine the content of those policies, does not
fill the vacuum. "[O]ne would be hard put to come up with many investigative or
prosecutorial 'policies' (other than those imposed by the Constitution or by
Congress through law) that are absolute. Almost all investigative and prosecutorial
decisions including the ultimate decision whether, after a technical violation of the
law has been found, prosecution is warranted-involve the balancing of innumer-
able legal and practical considerations." 0 3 Reference to the United States Attor-
neys' Manual underscores this point. Rarely does it set forth categorical impera-
tives; rather, it provides factors and considerations to guide the exercise of
discretion in a particular instance.' °4 It is, in short, not the words of relevant
102. Lynch & Howard, supra note 42, at C7.
103. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 707-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. See H.R. REP. No. 224, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 20-22 (1993) (discussing fact that most material in the U.S.
[Vol. 3:463
THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE
policies but the experience of applying those policies in similar cases that ensures
that the policies are enforced uniformly.
Accountability
The IC, like all prosecutors, " 'has more control over life, liberty, and reputation
than any other person in America.' ,105 Given the IC's vast powers and potentially
wide-ranging jurisdiction, as well as the incentives for him to employ both to the
fullest, there obviously exists the potential for abuses of the IC mechanism. For
example, the unlimited budget accorded ICs can be exploited far beyond the limits
of reasonableness. ICs can abuse their grand jury and other investigatory powers
and ignore with impunity DOJ policies and federal rules that protect all other
citizens (Judge Walsh's position that the grand jury secrecy rules embodied in
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) did not apply to him springs immediately
to mind). "[T]here is a danger that a special prosecutor could prolong an
investigation needlessly for any number of reasons, including publicity, political
leverage, or political reprisal." 10 6 An independent counsel may use the reporting
requirement to score political points, to settle personal scores, or purely for
professional aggrandizement. Most important, the IC may bring or decline cases
for reasons that have nothing to do with the merits.
The potential for abuse of power is exceeded only by the near certainty of
unequal treatment. Even if the IC does not abuse his powers in the sense of
employing them for improper purposes, it is likely that the target of the investiga-
tion will be subjected to scrutiny that is longer, more intensive, more invasive and
more public than that which the average citizen would suffer.
Is there any effective means of containing the potential abuses and inequities in
the operation of the statute? In the debates surrounding the IC statute, the term
"accountability" is often used but seldom defined. As is evidenced by Congress'
reliance upon the final reporting requirement as a means of imposing "accountabil-
ity" upon ICs, Congress appears to define "accountability" to mean that after the
conclusion of the investigation the IC will be judged according to the results
achieved and his or her reputation will fare accordingly. The judgment of history
reached after the termination of the investigation, however, obviously does nothing
to prevent, redress or correct abuses. Accountability should be defined by refer-
ence to the danger attributed to its absence: a runaway IC who abuses his
"awesome" powers of investigation or prosecution in the various ways described
Attorney's Manual is "in the nature of 'guidance,' which provides desirable room for the exercise of discretion,"
and amending section 594(f) in part because the pre-1994 language of the act "suggests that the Department's
policies themselves are mandatory in nature, when that is not always the case").
105. In re North, 16 F.3d 1234, 1238 (D.C. 1994) (quoting Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24
JUDICATURE 18, 18 (1940) (address delivered at the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys, April
1, 1940)).
106. S. REP. No. 496,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1982).
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above.10 7 If "accountability" is to mean anything, it seems to me to require some
degree of ongoing control to address such problems at the earliest possible
moment.
The most effective constraints upon the power of the IC lie in the traditional
checks that apply to all prosecutors: the trial court and the petit jury. These checks
act upon the most egregious potential abuse of the IC process-the case the IC
brings for illegitimate reasons. Belated as the remedies of judicial dismissal of an
indictment or jury acquittal may seem to the target, these devices work to blunt the
threat of vindictive or baseless prosecutions. This check does not, however,
prevent unwarranted declinations of cases or address the other potential abuses we
have explored. Nothing in the statute does.
While the Attorney General may be dismissed at will by the President or
impeached by Congress, a regulatory IC can be removed t0 8 and line DOJ
prosecutors can be fired, sanctioned or overruled if they abuse the powers of their
office, the IC, once appointed, is practically untouchable. A number of statutory
provisions are cited as reserving some measure of "accountability" to the
Executive, to the Special Division, and to Congress. The problem is that none of
these provisions provide effective real-time control, and indeed were not intended
to do so.
Executive: The entire purpose of the IC statute was to divest the Executive
Branch of control over politically sensitive investigations to the extent constitution-
ally possible. Not surprisingly, then, the asserted "controls" reserved to the
Executive over the conduct of IC investigations-the power of referral and the
power of removal for good cause-are intentionally anemic.
As noted above, the trigger for referral of matters to the Special Division is a
slight one. Further, "the limited power over referral is irrelevant to the question
whether, once appointed, the independent counsel exercises executive power free
from the President's control. "'09 After the referral is made, the identity of the IC
and the scope of his or her investigation is up to the Special Division.' t The
107. S. REP. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1982) (remarks of Arthur Christy, special prosecutor in the
Hamilton Jordan investigation) (" 'I think in the hands of an irresponsible person who is special prosecutor, you
might have a great many problems.... (C)ertainly during the course of the investigation, had I decided that I
wanted to use it for personal aggrandizement, I could have.' ").
108. Under the existing DOJ regulations, a regulatory IC can be removed for "good cause." 28 C.F.R. § 600.3
(1995). "So long as this regulation remains in force the Executive Branch is bound by it, and indeed the United
States as sovereign composed of the three branches is bound to respect and enforce it." United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974). It is also "theoretically possible for the Attorney General to amend or revoke the
regulation defining the Special Prosecutor's authority." Id.
109. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 707 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (1993); see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 678-679 (Special Division has the power "to
choose who will serve as independent counsel and the power to define his or her jurisdiction"); id. at 695-96 ("It
is undeniable that the Act reduces the amount of control or supervision that the Attorney General and, through
him, the President exercises over the investigation and prosecution of a certain class of alleged criminal activity.
The Attorney General is not allowed to appoint the individual of his choice; he does not determine the counsel's
jurisdiction; and his power to remove a counsel is limited.").
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trigger, once pulled, divests the Executive of all power over the IC except removal
for "good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that
substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel's duties."'l'
Categorizing the "good cause" removal provision as a viable means of execu-
tive control is "somewhat like referring to shackles as an effective means of
locomotion." " 2 Both legally and practically, this provision is more aptly viewed
as a restriction on executive discretion than as an effective mechanism for
accountability. The President's power to remove is qualified, and his exercise of
that power is subject to judicial review. It is unclear just what "cause" would
withstand judicial scrutiny although it appears that such fundamental problems as
an IC's refusal to follow DOJ policies would not qualify.1 13 In 1992, the Justice
Department "admitted it had never developed any standards or procedures for
using this authority and expressed little interest in doing so., , l" 4 Why not?
Because, given the strength of public reaction to the "Saturday Night Massacre"
and its political repercussions, it is difficult to conceive of any administration
exercising this power absent patent physical disability or madness on the IC's part.
Proponents of the IC statute also point to the fact that it requires an IC to comply
with the DOJ's law enforcement policies "except to the extent that to do so would
be inconsistent with the purposes of [the IC statute]." "1 5 This provision provides
for no ongoing control as Congress provided no mechanism for the enforcement of
these norms. While Congress "urged" that ICs follow DOJ policies and opined
that if the IC does deviate from established practices, he "should thoroughly
explain his reasons for doing so in his report to the court at the conclusion of his
investigation," it also made clear that a failure to follow policy would not
"constitute grounds for removal of the special prosecutor by the Attorney
General." 116
Special Division: Those sections of the statute that vest powers in the Court are
similarly toothless. An IC must comply with a court-defined area of inquiry, which,
as discussed above, is not a terribly meaningful restriction. In any case, "once the
court has appointed a counsel and defined his or her jurisdiction, it has no power to
supervise or control the activities of the counsel." " "The Act simply does not
give the Division the power to 'supervise' the independent counsel in the exercise
111. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1994).
112. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. S. REp. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1982).
114. S. REP. No. 101, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1993).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f)(1) (1994). In 1982, Congress amended the original statute, which provided that ICs
were required to follow DOJ policies only "to the extent the special prosecutor deems appropriate," to require
that ICs follow the written or other established DOJ policies "except where not possible." S. REP. No. 496, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1982). The current language was added in 1994. See H.R. REP. No. 224, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
20-22 (1993) (discussing amendments to the language).
116. S. REp. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1982).
117. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695.
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of his or her investigative or prosecutorial authority." 18 As the Special Division
itself has said, "[t]he Independent Counsel does not operate under our supervision
and his acts ... do not bear our aegis."'.. 9
Congress: As the Supreme Court explained in Morrison:
[W]ith the exception of the power of impeachment-which applies to all
officers of the United States--Congress retained for itself no powers of control
or supervision over an independent counsel. The Act does empower certain
Members of Congress to request the Attorney General to apply for the
appointment of an independent counsel, but the Attorney General has no duty
to comply with the request, although he must respond within a certain time
limit. § 592 (g). Other than that, Congress' role under the Act is limited to
receiving reports or other information and oversight of the independent
counsel's activities, § 595 (a), functions that we have recognized generally as
being incidental to the legislative function of Congress. 120
Notably, Congress has refused to use its greatest power-the power of the
purse-to control the conduct or length of IC investigations, instead providing ICs
with a virtually unlimited charter. '
2
'
Reporting: Congress seems to have envisioned that a primary means of ensuring
IC "accountability" would be the final report requirement.' 22 As an after-the-fact
accounting, however, it is by definition incapable of controlling on-going abuses.
As the American Bar Association's Section of Criminal Justice concluded in
August 1993:
[T]he reporting requirement fails to fulfill [the accountability goal] since the
independent counsel's decision not to prosecute cannot be challenged by the
court or anyone else. Moreover, the fact that the report is filed only at the
conclusion of the independent counsel's work, as the last act before leaving
office, further belies the perception that the reporting requirement provides
some accountability. Any feared damage resulting from the work of an
independent counsel will have occurred well before the report is filed. Once the
report is filed, the independent counsel ceases to exist and there would be no
recourse for wrongful acts. 1 23
118. Id. at 681.
119. In re North, 16 F.3d 1234, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
120. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694. 1 am unaware of any congressional oversight hearings that have actually been
held on the "conduct" of IC investigations. See also 139 CONG. REc. S 15,876 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993) (Congress
has never actually convened oversight hearing to address work of a sitting IC); 133 CONG. REc. H28,587 (daily ed.
Oct. 21, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Rodino) (noting "chilling effect" that would be caused by oversight of ongoing
investigations). As a constitutional matter, it would raise serious executive privilege and separation of powers
issues were Congress to compel a federal prosecutor to discuss the substance of his investigation or to explain his
prosecution decisions in a particular case. Whether such issues would also be raised in the IC context is an open
question.
121. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing IC's unlimited budget).
122. S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 69, 70-71 (1978).
123. A.B.A., SEC. OF CRIM. JUST. REP. TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES-RECOMMENDATION 12-13 (Aug. 1993).
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The reporting requirement is not only ineffectual, it is also uncertain in scope,
inequitable in theory, and potentially grossly unfair in application. In short, far
from providing accountability, the reporting requirement actually poses one of the
greatest dangers for abuse of the IC process.
First, the scope of the reporting requirement is unclear, inviting abuse of its
license. Does the "the work of the independent counsel" within the meaning of the
statute include (1) simply a sketch of the investigation (that is, the number, and
perhaps, identity of witnesses questioned; the numbers of subpoenas issued; the
types of tests applied to physical evidence; and the like); (2) a further summary of
the evidence yielded by these sources; (3) a statement assessing the credibility of
the sources and resolving disputed factual issues; and/or (4) a conclusion regarding
the legal or ethical propriety of the subject's actions? One could certainly argue
that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, "the work of the independent counsel"
should be limited to (1), above, because if Congress intended to require a more
detailed summary of evidence or factual or legal conclusions, it knows how to say
so and it did not.124 However, rather than exercising restraint in reading the
statutory mandate, a number of ICs, most notably Judge Walsh, have read it quite
broadly to include (1) through (4) above; indeed, Judge Walsh's Iran-Contra report
"is rife with accusations of guilt of criminal conduct against persons never
indicted or convicted." 1
25
ICs' apparent tendency to read the reporting mandate broadly exacerbates the
inequity of the requirement itself:
Consistent with the power and responsibility of their office, prosecutors do not
issue reports, and they do not pronounce persons guilty of crimes who have not
been indicted, tried, and convicted. The filing of reports by Independent
Counsels is 'a complete departure from the authority of a United States
Attorney' and is 'contrary to the practice in federal grand jury investiga-
tions.' 126
The longstanding federal prosecutorial tradition of not commenting where a case
has been declined is grounded in both practical policy and fundamental fairness.
A fair and complete summary of an investigation will be difficult to achieve
given the legal constraints upon federal prosecutors, and may actually impair
future investigative efforts. For example, as the Iran-Contra report illustrates, it
may be impossible for an IC to set forth a full summary of the factual circum-
stances of the matter referred without violating Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 6(e)'s bar on disclosing matters occurring before a grand jury or without
124. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (1994) (Inspector General report of inspection shall contain thorough review
of facts relating to allegations); 18 U.S.C. § 3333(b) (1994) (report from special grand jury shall contain facts and
evidence supporting its conclusions).
125. In re North, 16 F3d 1234, 1238 (D.C. Cit. 1994).
126. In re North, 16 F.3d at 1238 (quoting In re Sealed Motion, 880 F.2d 1367, 1369-70 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
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compromising confidential sources. 127 Disclosure of witness statements may also
create disincentives to cooperation, and may threaten witnesses with embarrass-
ment or harassment from which normal DOJ practices would shield them. 128
More important, this tradition is required by basic principles of fairness unique
to the criminal process. If a prosecutor declines to prosecute but publicly describes,
or worse, assesses, the evidence against a subject, he in effect unilaterally imposes
a criminal stigma that will wreak havoc on the subject's reputation and career. The
potential unfairness of the final report takes its most extreme form in cases in
which an IC concludes that persons, not indicted or tried, violated the law or
ethical requirements. One prime example is the Iran-Contra report, which, as the
Special Division noted,
repeatedly accuses named individuals of crimes, although in many instances
the individual was never indicted, if indicted was never convicted, or if
convicted the conviction was reversed. These accusations include charges that
named individuals were guilty of a conspiracy charged in a count that was
dismissed before trial, that various named public officials engaged in efforts to
obstruct justice, where such individuals were never indicted, let alone con-
victed, and instances in which the Report charges that individuals were
'factually guilty' even though the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit had reversed the only conviction relevant to the
charge under discussion.' 
29
Although clearly unhappy with this commentary in the report, the Special Division
approved its public release, complete with its discussion of matters occurring
before the grand jury which would normally be protected from disclosure by
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). 130 In so doing, the Special Division
noted that the factor weighing most strongly in favor of full release of the report
was the fact that the filing contained information already publicly known, or
publicly known in misleading part. ' 31 The information, including secret grand jury
material, had been previously disseminated in IC statements, leaks and four
interim reports filed with Congress by the IC, who took the position that he was not
bound by the secrecy standards of Rule 6(e) applicable to all other federal
prosecutors.132 The Court recognized that its decision might set a dangerous
precedent in that a future IC, wishing to ensure the release of his report, may "go
on television and make comments accusing subjects of his report of crimes so that
127. The Special Division noted with respect to the Iran-Contra report that "[t]he intermingling of grand jury
materials with the rest of the Report is more like leaven in a loaf of bread. It cannot be separated out. Release is an
up-or-down vote; redaction is simply not possible." In re North, 1234 F3d at 1242.
128. Cf Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1979) (discussing reasons for
preserving grand jury secrecy).
129. In re North, 16 F.3d at 1237-38.
130. Id. at 1244.
131. Id. at 1240-41, 1244.
132. Id. at 1240-41, 1442-45.
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the Court could later find that the contents of the report were already public." 1 33
However, the Court concluded, "[a]s this Court has no supervisory power, there
would be little we could do about it. As the Independent Counsel is virtually
without supervision, there would be little anyone could do about it. This danger
may be inherent in the niature of the Independent Counsel." 1
34
In discussing criminal wrongdoing not charged or proved, Judge Walsh relied
upon a provision in the statute requiring that the IC include in his report the
"'reasons for not prosecuting any matter within the prosecutorial jurisdiction of
such independent counsel.' ,135 In the 1994 reauthorization statute, the final
reporting provision was amended to delete this requirement.' 36 Thus, under the
present statute, the "work of the independent counsel" no longer includes "the
reasons for not prosecuting" nor, by implication, the factual and legal reasons why
an IC believes someone culpable despite a decision not to prosecute.
The legislative history of this amendment is muddled, but contains some
indication of a congressional intent to relieve ICs of the obligation to report the
reasons for failing to bring a case but to permit an IC to include those reasons if he
believes that the public interest requires it, for example where the report com-
pletely vindicates the subject.137 Assuming that this murky legislative history can
override the implications of the plain language of the statute-a questionable
proposition-the public interest should never require the filing of a report by a
prosecutor summarizing evidence, resolving factual disputes and concluding that
persons, not indicted or tried, committed wrongdoing.
This type of discussion is obviously contrary to the normal presumption in
criminal felony cases that the government must prove its case to an impartial
tribunal before going public with accusations of criminal wrongdoing. It robs
public officials of that which the grand jury is designed to provide all citizens:
" 'the invaluable function in our society of standing between the accuser and the
accused, whether the latter be an individual, minority group, or other, to determine
whether a charge is founded upon reason or dictated by an intimidating power or
by malice and personal ill will.' "138 This function is all the more important in the
IC context because of the skewing effect that the IC's unlimited resources and
singular focus may exert upon his exercise of prosecutorial discretion; it is in this
context, where a practically unaccountable IC is making decisions, that the grand
133. Id. at 1241.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1238 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 595(b)(2) (1982)).
136. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(1)(B) (1994); see also 140 CONG. REc. S6,374 (daily ed. May 25, 1994) (remarks
of Sen. Levin).
137. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 511, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1994); 140 CONG. REc. S6,374 (daily ed. May
25, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Levin) (the amendments do not prohibit such explanation, but give the IC discretion to
include it when he "determines it would be in the public interest").
138. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 74 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Wood v. Georgia,
370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962)),
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jury is needed most urgently to ensure that the IC's power does not result in grossly
inequitable or, worse, baseless prosecutions.
Further, this type of commentary is fundamentally inconsistent with every
citizen's "right, with a plethora of attendant constitutional protections, to stand
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury of his peers.
U.S. Const. amends. V, VI." 139 Fundamental to our criminal process is the belief
that prior to the imposition of criminal stigma, a defendant is entitled all the
constitutional protections necessary to achieve a fair result and to ajury determina-
tion, made after hearing both sides, of the relevant facts. It is the criminal jury, not
an IC or any other prosecutor, who is charged with finding the facts and
determining whether the government has sufficient proof to rebut the presumption
of innocence to which every citizen is entitled.
At the very least, fundamental considerations of due process require that a
subject essentially indicted and tried by IC report be given a meaningful opportu-
nity vindicate him- or herself. Although the statute permits subjects an opportunity
to respond to such an IC report, 140 this rebuttal provision is fairly meaningless.
Subjects of IC investigations, absent indictment, do not have access to the IC's
files, cannot call upon equivalent investigative resources, and do not have the
ability to compel sworn testimony from witnesses or the production of other
critical discovery that may assist them in rebutting the charges.
The injustice suffered where a prosecutor comments in any way upon cases that
he has declined to bring is particularly acute given the high-profile and official
nature of the IC final report. The Special Division has attempted to erase any
misconception that its public release of an IC's report means that the report is
issued "under the Court's aegis" and bears its official "imprimatur."' 4 1 However,
even without the Court's stamp of approval, the public is still more likely to accept
as credible the IC's report to the Court than whatever defense the subjects are able
to put forth under these constraints, not least of all because the subjects, by virtue
of the report's allegations, will obviously be viewed as anything but disinterested.
As the Independent Counsel Subcommittee of the American Bar Association has
concluded, then, "[i]n Independent Counsel investigations in which no prosecu-
tion is brought, covered persons should not have their reputations damaged and
their privacy invaded by disclosure of information that does not suffice to give rise
to a criminal charge." 142
The final reporting requirement, in sum, creates incentives for ICs to investigate
too long and report too fulsomely1 43; its contours are so vague as to invite abuses
139. In reNorth, 16F3d 1234,1238(1994).
140. 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(2) (1994).
141. In re North, 16 F.3d at 1239.
142. INDEPENDENT COUNSEL SUBCOMM. OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECrION OF THE ABA WHITE COLLAR CRIME
COMM., SUMMARY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7-8 (Aug. 19, 1989).
143. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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that the Special Division is in no position to remedy; it constitutes a signal
departure from the rules applied to all other citizens; it is incompatible with the
grand jury tradition; it contravenes fundamental notions of fairness in the criminal
process; and it is ineffective to further its stated purpose of ensuring IC accountabil-
ity.
The final reporting requirement also seems to have contributed to the public
perception that it is an IC who should be charged with investigating any politically
charged allegations-whether or not facially criminal-and providing the public
with a full, definitive and impartial report. The above demonstrates that the IC, as a
prosecutor, faces obstacles peculiar to the criminal process that make such a
function unworkable and unfair.
COSTS OF THE STATUTE
The IC process clearly carries with it a grave potential for abuse and inequity. It
is important to recognize the scope of the human, financial and systemic costs
incurred when these dangers are realized.
Allegations of wrongdoing by public officials referred to an IC immediately
raise the specter of criminal punishment, not just political exile. Further, a criminal
investigation under the IC statute is unique in its highly public nature. As former
Attorney General Griffin Bell explained, an IC investigation is normally
"announced under great notoriety, and any conclusion reached is likewise
notorious. Other citizens are investigated without announcement-indeed
usually under great confidentiality given the secrecy of the grand jury rule,
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6(e), and the practice of the Department
of Justice in not commenting on ongoing investigations. Usually the fact of an
investigation is never known if there is no indictment. This is completely
contrary to the practice in the Independent Counsel cases to date." 144
Judging from public opinion polls, the sound and fury surrounding the appoint-
ment of an IC creates a public sense that there is something to an allegation--even
though the referral itself means nothing of the sort given the low statutory trigger.
Press reports on the continuing work of the IC over time-such as the issuance of
subpoenas, grand jury appearances of important persons, and subsidiary indict-
ments-keep the pressure up and lend an additional air of credibility to the charges
initially referred. As discussed above, the reporting requirement simply adds insult
to injury. In operation, then, "[r]eputations are savaged, effectiveness in office is
crippled, and there is lingering suspicion even though an investigatory target is
exonerated." 145 "Careers are held captive, families torn apart and the mental and
144. 133 CONG. REc. H28,566 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1987) (remarks of Rep. Swindell quoting Judge Bell).
145. 128 CONG. REc. S30,274 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Kindness).
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physical health of those under investigation are put under strain. It is not unusual
for people involved to lose their jobs, just when they need money to cover legal
expenses." '
46
IC investigators, armed with a limitless checkbook, a flexible jurisdictional
mandate, no competing case demands, and all the time they need, can investigate
their case far beyond that which would seem reasonable in the normal case and
have the incentive to pursue avenues that would not survive the competition for
scarce resources were the matter under DOJ scrutiny. The consequences of such
diligence may be quite onerous not only for the subjects or targets of the
investigation, but also for a wide array of witnesses caught up by, but not
implicated in, the investigation. As former "Passportgate" IC Joseph E. diGenova
recently commented:
[W]hat about the emotional and financial cost to people caught up in the
maelstrom? At great expense, lawyers must be hired, even by the most
insignificant witnesses. The dire consequences of merely misspeaking, which
could result in a false-statement charge, are high, given the prosecutor's vast
powers. 147
On a purely economic level, it is we, the taxpayers, who are paying for all of
this, and paying dearly. What are we buying and at what cost to other law
enforcement priorities? Judge Walsh's investigation cost nearly $40 million and
the ancillary bills, including the cost to various government agencies of complying
with the document requests and subpoenas issued by his office, brought the total
tab up to about $100 million. 148 These funds yielded, over the course of seven
146. diGenova, supra note 53, at A25. Congress would argue that it has alleviated the financial burdens
imposed by the IC statute through its attorneys fees provision. The statute contains a "narrow exception" to the
general rule that most non-indigent persons who participate in criminal proceedings, whether as subject , targets
or witnesses, cannot obtain publicly-funded reimbursement of attorneys fees. S. REP. No. 101, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 20 (1993). This exception, however, is very narrow. It provides reimbursement only for "subjects" of IC
proceedings who are not indicted and would not have incurred the fees but for the requirements of the IC law. 28
U.S.C. § 593(0 (1994); see S. REP. No. 101, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1993). Witnesses' and immunized
subjects' fees are not covered, nor are the fees of persons ultimately indicted but acquitted or otherwise
exonerated. Id. Further, even a covered subject who is ultimately not indicted is unlikely to be made whole. For
example, Congress has discouraged government payment of prevailing white-collar legal rates. See H.R. CoNF.
REP. No. 511, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-15 (1994) (Hourly rates of $40 to $75 per hour are reasonable while market
rates of $300 to $400 per hour should not be fully recoverable because "Congress did not intend that properly
recoverable attorney fees under this statute be construed to be what the market will bear in the private sector.
Rather, Congress intends that the reasonableness of attorney fee requests under the independent counsel law be
judged, not solely with reference to the rates commanded by expensive legal counsel, but also with reference to
what cost is reasonable for the taxpayers to bear."). Perhaps more importantly, it will be nearly impossible for a
subject to prove that he was subjected to a far more exhaustive and lengthy investigation by the IC than he would
have been by the DOJ. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 511, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1994) (criticizing "overly
generous" interpretation of attorneys fees awards and reaffirming original congressional intent that "the special
court construe the but-for requirement of the attorney fee provision narrowly").
147. diGenova, supra note 53, atA25.
148. H.R. REP. No. 224, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 37 (1993) (dissenting views of Rep. Hyde, et al.); see also id. at
43 (additional views of Rep. Fish) ("Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh, now well into the seventh year of his
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years, the indictment of fourteen persons. 14 9 In terms of the opportunity cost of
these monies, it may be illuminating to compare the Iran-Contra results with the
statistics achieved by U.S. Attorneys Offices with comparable budgets. According
to the Department of Justice, the operating budgets for two of the largest U.S.
Attorneys Offices-the Southern District of Florida and the Central District of
California-for fiscal year 1995 were $39.0 million and $39.8 million, respec-
tively.15 0 These budgets funded the filing of a total of approximately 8,000
criminal and civil cases and other unquantified investigative activity.
51
The statute also takes a heavy toll in more intangible, but equally important
ways. First, "[j]ustifying the smallest details of a past transaction or decision has
become part of the job description for high executive office, always with the
suggestion of public scandal and personal ruin." 15 2 Who could blame persons in
the Executive Branch for retreating from principled claims of, say, executive
privilege in the face of congressional hostility backed by the prospect of an IC
investigation? Theodore B. Olson's fate provides a sobering example of how big a
stick Congress has when it threatens to call for an IC to investigate a source of
conflict with the administration. In that matter, Congress and the Executive were
engaged in a dispute over documents that Congress had subpoenaed from the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and that the President, acting on the
advice of the DOJ, ordered the EPA to withhold on grounds of executive
privilege.' 53 Although the document dispute was ultimately settled, Congress
determined to investigate the DOJ's role in the controversy and called Assistant
Attorney General Olson to testify before a House Subcommittee. 154 The House
Judiciary Committee subsequently claimed that Mr. Olson's testimony was mislead-
ing and called for and got an IC investigation. The investigation began in May
1986 and concluded in January 1989 with IC Alexia Morrison's decision not to
bring criminal charges.' 55 Mr. Olson reportedly spent $1.3 million in legal fees15 6
and took to "jogging by flashlight in the middle of the night" to relieve the
investigation of the Iran-Contra affair, has spent approximately $40 million. The average cost for prosecutions per
criminal defendant in a U.S. Attorney's Office is approximately $10,000; Independent Counsel Walsh is currently
averaging over $2.5 million per defendant."); Toni Locy, Independent Counsels Have Spent $17 Million in
Probing Clinton Aides, WASH. POST, April 2, 1996, at A4.
149. In re North, 16 F3d 1234, 1240 (1994).
150. Fax from Financial Management Staff, Executive Office for United States Attorneys, U.S. Department of
Justice, to Julie O'Sullivan, Associate Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Center 2 (Mar. 25, 1996) (on file with
author).
151. Fax from Data Analysis Group, Executive Office for United States Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice,
to Julie O'Sullivan, Associate Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Center 2 (Mar. 23, 1996) (on file with author).
152. Lynch & Howard, supra note 42, at C7.
153. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 665 (1988).
154. Id. at 665-66 .
155. Ruth Marcus, Ex-Official's Testimony Not 'Designed to Conceal'; Decision Against Prosecuting Olson
Explained, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1989, at A4.
156. Mes H. Andrews, Impartial Prosecutor or Loose Cannon?, CHI-STIAN SCi. MONITOR, Oct. 25, 1993, at 13.
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pressures of the process.' 57 Given Mr. Olson's experience, others in the Executive
Branch may well weigh more heavily the personal risks attendant upon making
politically difficult choices. In such situations, the harshness of the enforcement
mechanism may actually deter aggressive executive action and have a dampening
effect on the substantive conduct of executive functions. 158
Second, we recognize and are willing to accept the disincentives for public
service created when we impose upon public officials a higher standard of conduct.
However, the disincentive for public service may well become unacceptable when
one factors in the operation of the IC mechanism. That mechanism ensures that the
investigation of allegations of misconduct will be blindingly public and may well
exceed anything that an average citizen would be forced to bear in terms of length,
scope and personal, professional, and reputational cost. Moreover, public office
does not pay exorbitant wages, yet subjects of IC investigations have reportedly
racked up legal bills in the millions of dollars. Most important, these consequences
may well be visited upon those who trip over political landmines (as apparently
was the case for Theodore Olson) or inadvertently violate regulatory requirements
because, as discussed above, the statute essentially bars an Attorney General from
declining to refer a matter to the Special Division on the ground that the alleged
transgression was likely the result of negligence or ignorance rather than criminal
intent. Those who willingly undertake to conform to higher standards of conduct
for the privilege of serving in government may find the privilege significantly less
alluring when a misstep, even an entirely inadvertent one, may have such ruinous
consequences.
Finally, even were these costs deemed worthwhile in the exceptional case,
over-use of the statute has created its own problems. The excessive invocation of
the statute trivializes the IC mechanism. When the Whitewater investigation
began, witness cooperation was the order of the day, perhaps because it was the
only game in town and one of its subjects was the President. It appears that the
increasing number of recent IC appointments involving lower-ranking officials and
the less than earthshaking nature of the wrongdoing alleged has devalued the
currency of the IC mechanism, invited claims of political persecution, encouraged
non-cooperation and ultimately perhaps harmed the efficacy of IC investigations.
Most important, this, overuse needlessly undermines public confidence in the
integrity of the DOJ. It is one thing to say that the DOJ cannot, or should not for
appearances sake, be entrusted with an investigation of the President. But what
message are we sending when we suggest that the DOJ or local U.S. Attorneys
cannot be trusted to investigate whether former Housing and Urban Development
Secretary Henry Cisneros misled federal investigators during his pre-nomination
interviews about payments he made to his former mistress? Further, undermining
157. Ronald J. Ostrow & Robert L. Jackson, Efficiency, Ethics of 1978 Independent Counsel Law Questioned,
L.A. TuMES, Sept. 20, 1992, at A4.
158. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 712-13 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 3 3:463
THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE
the public standing of the DOJ in political cases of less than startling import may
well encourage the public to believe, in non-political cases, that DOJ has other
suspect agendas equally irrelevant to the impartial administration of the criminal
laws.
CONCLUSION
It is possible to address some of the problems discussed above by tinkering with
the statute. At the very least, the statute should be amended so as to drastically
reduce the number of "covered persons," possibly to include only the President
and very senior DOJ appointees; raise the threshold showing for referral to the
Special Division for appointment of an IC; provide some means of qualifying a
panel of IC candidates from which the Special Division may choose particular ICs;
and extend the attorneys' fees provisions. Other problems would be much more
difficult to address by statutory amendment without interfering with the effective
conduct of IC investigations, such as imposing arbitrary limitations on duration or
cost. Some cannot be remedied at all without undermining the fundamental
premise of the statute (or violating constitutional strictures), such as requiring
real-time accountability of the IC to the Executive, Congress or the Special
Division.
Abandoning the statute entirely seems to me to be the better alternative. The
power to investigate and prosecute should be returned to its constitutional home
for close to two centuries, the Executive Branch. As in the past, in extraordinary
cases where the appearance or reality of a genuine conflict of interest requires that
a matter be referred to someone outside the DOJ, that referral should be made to a
regulatory IC. 15 9 History demonstrates that, properly chosen, regulatory ICs stand
as good a chance as the modem day statutory IC to achieve a result that will satisfy
the demands of justice and the public.' 60
For example, when President Nixon ordered the DOJ to remove Watergate
(regulatory) Special Counsel Archibald Cox from office when Mr. Cox pressed his
investigation by issuing a subpoena for White House tape recordings and other
records, 16 ' Attorney General Richardson and his deputy William Ruckelshaus
resigned rather than carry out that order; finally, Solicitor General Robert Bork
complied and fired Mr. Cox.' 62 According to congressional wisdom, it was this
159. See HARRIGER, supra note 30 at 13-39 (analyzing "three official corruption cases in which allegations of
wrongdoing by members of the executive branch led to the ad hoc appointment of special prosecutors: the Teapot
Dome scandal of the 1920s, the tax scandals of the 1950s, and the Watergate scandal of the 1970s").
160. See. e.g., id. at 38 ("The study of ad hoc uses of special prosecutors suggests that there are some
advantages to presidential appointment of special prosecutors that would exist to a lesser extent under a statutory
independent appointment mechanism"; the findings also suggest that "the case against executive appointment has
been overstated and is based more on appearances than on reality").
161. S. REP. No. 101, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1993).
162. Id. at6.
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"Saturday Night Massacre" that "shattered public confidence in our system of
justice," necessitating the enactment of the IC statute. 163 What is overlooked is the
fact that the system subsequently worked as it should, despite the "Massacre": a
second Watergate regulatory special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, was named, the
investigation continued, and it eventually led to successful criminal prosecutions,
impeachment proceedings, and President Nixon's resignation." 6 Further, even if a
second special prosecutor had not been named to replace Mr. Cox, President
Nixon's actions in the Saturday Night Massacre might well have done him in
anyway. In other words, the political costs of interference created its own checks
and balances.
Another modem example of successful use of a regulatory IC is Attorney
General Griffin Bell's appointment of Paul J. Curran as "special counsel" to
investigate the "Carter Peanut Warehouse Case." Congress itself acknowledged
that" [o]nce Attorney General Bell granted Mr. Curran total independence and Mr.
Curran issued a detailed report clearing President Carter and his brother Bill of all
criminal wrongdoing, public confidence in the thoroughness of the investigation
was restored." 
65
Of a certainty, the fact that a regulatory IC is selected by the Attorney General
will provide politicians with additional ammunition with which to attempt to
impeach the eventual results of the investigation. If the Whitewater case is any
precedent, however, it makes little difference; due to the circumstances of his
appointment and the reigning political dynamic, Judge Starr has suffered a great
deal more questioning about his impartiality than Robert Fiske ever did.
It is also true that the conduct of a regulatory IC investigation will be subject to
many of the same objections as can presently be levelled at statutory IC investiga-
tions. In particular, the more "independence" a regulatory IC is granted under DOJ
regulations to promote public confidence in the integrity of the investigation, the
less effective control or accountability exists, with some of the attendant problems
discussed above. On balance, a sparingly invoked regulatory IC mechanism still
appears preferable because this tradeoff is not as extreme as it is in the case of the
statutory IC. If a statutory IC proves judgment-impaired, politically motivated or
just plain inept, what can be done? As demonstrated above, in practical reality,
nothing. The political unaccountability of the Special Division judges is intended
to ensure that they will choose a truly "independent" and competent IC; it also
means that if the Division does not, there is no accountability as well as no
politically feasible remedy. If the Attorney General were to select a regulatory IC
of suspect partiality or inadequate ability, however, she and the administration
would pay a price. The Attorney General and the administration generally are
accountable through the political process and, in extreme cases, the impeachment
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. S. REP. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1982).
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mechanism. The fact that an IC who clearly abuses the powers of his office was her
choice may also make it more feasible for the Attorney General to remove the
offending IC and replace him with a more responsible alternative. However
indirect these controls may be, they provide more accountability than is available
under the statutory alternative.
Ridding ourselves of the statutory IC mechanism may have the ultimate value,
moreover, of reorienting the process-a process fundamentally distorted by the
"lessons" of Watergate and the statute itself. As discussed above, judging from the
clamor for appointment of an IC that arises whenever allegations of misconduct by
senior administration officials are made, the public seems to have embraced the
view that the IC is the only credible means of sorting out such allegations. Final
reports such as that issued in the Iran-Contra case fuel the public's perception. This
view in turn ensures that the appointment process and the conduct of these
investigations will become political battlegrounds. The politicization of the pro-
cess means that partisans will have incentives to tarnish the credibility of
individual ICs in politically charged cases with the object of promoting public
distrust of the investigation. Thus, although the existence of the statutory IC
mechanism itself is a comfort to the public, the statute may not actually work in the
cases in which it is most needed-where the investigations are likely of the
greatest political consequence--to promote public confidence in the criminal
justice process.
Perhaps more troubling, however, the perceived importance of the IC mecha-
nism has resulted in a regrettable shift in focus: the issue is no longer whether an
official engaged in misconduct that should disqualify him from serving the public,
but rather whether the official committed a criminal offense. This "criminaliza-
tion" obviously has serious implications for covered persons, and may create
unfortunate disincentives for public office. But it also seems to have problematic
consequences beyond the individual case.
When accusations of wrongdoing by high-ranking public officials arise, the
public interest lies primarily in answering those accusations so that the citizens
may exercise their franchise to clean house. Exacting criminal penalties for such
wrongdoing is obviously important for the usual reasons underlying the imposition
of criminal punishment (e.g., deterrence) and, in political cases, for reinforcing the
public's belief in the evenhanded administration of justice. Ultimately, however, it
seems to me-as Watergate demonstrates-that imposing criminal punishment
should be secondary to the more important goal of exposing wrongdoers, letting
the political processes work to rid the government of those persons, and thereby
restoring confidence in honest and effective government. The statutory IC mecha-
nism itself constitutes a concession-unwarranted by history or, I submit, general
experience-that the normal processes of government cannot be counted upon to
work; the appointment of an IC, then, necessarily compromises this goal.
Moreover, this function is not one that a prosecutor is qualified or equipped to
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fulfill. What the public appears to expect from the IC is not just a determination as
to whether sufficient evidence exists to believe something criminal has been done,
which is the limit of an IC's prosecutorial competence. Rather, the expectation
seems to be that the IC will publish all the evidence gathered and reach a
determination as to the ethical as well as criminal implications of the conduct
found-implicitly, a conclusion as to the subject's fitness for office. This task is
alien to the prosecutorial function as properly defined, and is fundamentally
inconsistent with traditional notions of fair process in the imposition of criminal
stigma and punishment. First, the criminal process will not yield meaningful
answers regarding the broader question of competency for office. The criminal
standard is too narrow; a determination by a prosecutor that there is insufficient
proof to demonstrate that a person is a crook beyond a reasonable doubt does not
answer the question whether that person is qualified to be President. Nor, given the
evidentiary constraints applicable in criminal trials and the narrow legal challenges
available on appeal, will an acquittal or an appellate reversal after conviction
answer this latter, critical question. Second, using the criminal process to test
fitness for public service distorts that process, leading to prosecution of those who
should not be charged as well as to "vindication" of people who need to be turned
out of office, even if they are not prosecuted, are acquitted, or have their
convictions overturned on appeal. Finally, the prosecutor has an obligation to use
the awesome powers of his office to determine whether criminal conduct has been
committed and if so by whom. His job is to decline-in fairness without
comment-if no case is warranted, and to indict and try criminal cases where the
evidence and other considerations dictate. It is fundamentally inconsistent with the
traditions of his office and the grand jury and criminal trial process for a prosecutor
to be charged with finding out whether an official engaged in ethically questionable
conduct, reporting the particulars to the public and defending that report in the
public realm.
The result of the apparent disjunction between the public perception of the
prosecutorial function in the IC context and the reality of prosecutorial compe-
tence is unfortunate both from the public's and the IC's point of view. The fact that
a responsible prosecutor is bound by grand jury secrecy and other ethical and legal
constraints which prevent him from disclosing much of what he discovers means
that the public cannot (or should, in fairness, not) receive a full accounting from
him. Because these are, by definition, political cases or cases with which political
hay can be made, those with a partisan interest in impugning a prosecutor's choices
will never be satisfied, and a prosecutor will never be able to respond fully to the
inevitable criticism. The public, in short, does not get what it demands, needs and
is paying dearly for-a full and final determination of what happened that it can
rely upon when making leadership choices. The IC does not get what he has a right
to expect-public acceptance of and respect for his work product and credit for his
public service.
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Perhaps it is, in the final analysis, Congress, or a delegee of Congress, that
should be the central actor here, not a criminal prosecutor. Congress has the
powers necessary to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by high-ranking public
officials, and has proved itself capable on prior occasions, most notably in
Watergate. Indeed, it is arguable that witnesses, particularly politicians, called to
account before the public spotlight may well be more forthcoming and provide
greater cooperation than they will when attempting to fend off criminal charges in
the secret confines of the grand jury. Ceding primary responsibility to Congress
obviously is not without its problems, including the possible compromise of
subsequent criminal prosecutions. More important given our primary aim, the
inevitable partisanship involved in a congressional committee investigation is at
best distracting and at worst saps the inquiry of its credibility and effectiveness. It
may be that Congress should consider delegating its investigative function to a
strictly bipartisan panel of lawyers and investigators, which would have a
circumscribed mandate (in terms of subject matter as well as available time and
resources). Such a congressional delegee would have a greater chance of using its
dual partisanship in a constructive way-that is, to ensure that both sides of the
story are fully aired and available for public digestion. If fairly run, a congressional
inquiry of this kind may permit the effective discovery and adversarial testing of
evidence through which the public will learn what it needs to know and perhaps
what it needs to fix.
1996]
